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THE CONTINUUM OF COERCION: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE TREATMENT OF
MENTALLY DISORDERED PERSONS
ROBERT D. MILLER*
One dictionary defines coercion as the use of restraint, hindrance, compul-
sion, or force, but does not differentiate between internal and external coer-
cion.' Furthermore, this definition does not resolve the differences between
critics from the legal and mental health communities, the extreme (and typical-
ly most vocal) members of which tend to simplify the issues to the point that
no meaningful dialogue is possible.
Coercion does not exist in a vacuum; it exists on a continuum upon which
bright lines are arbitrarily placed to delineate acceptable uses of physical or
psychological force. The perception of coercion by the various parties involved
in the mental health and legal systems is similar to the fable of the elephant
and the blind men: one's concept of coercion depends on one's perspective.
This article discusses coercion in the context of the public system of
mental health care. While most law review articles limit their discussion of
coercion to external physical control, this article considers both external and
internal coercion from various sources as it affects all the actors in the system,
and argues that all aspects of coercion must be considered before appropriate
policy decisions can be made.
The introduction discusses the traditional legal rights driven concept of
coercion. The second part discusses coercion experienced by mentally disor-
dered persons, beginning with external clinical coercion, the most common
subject of concern. A discussion follows of external legal coercion on patients
(Part Ill), and then a discussion of external social coercion on patients (Part
IV). The last section addressing patient issues discusses internal coercion
experienced by mental patients (Part V).
The sixth part explores coercion of mental health professionals, a subject
virtually ignored, at least in those terms, in the literature. The categories listed
are somewhat arbitrary, in the sense that considerable overlap exists among
them. Nevertheless, I believe that teasing them apart is essential if we are to
develop a more comprehensive understanding of those overlaps, and of the
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(often unintended) effects of pressures brought to bear on all the actors in the
mental health system. This article attempts to do so, albeit briefly, in Part VII.
I. INTRODUCTION
This discussion begins with the assumption that ours is a nation founded
on principles of individual liberty and autonomy, with a Constitution and laws
crafted to protect those individual legal rights from infringement by govern-
ment. As Stephen Morse states, courts today demonstrate "a preference for
liberty,"2 but the problem comes in defining "liberty." John Stuart Mill's vir-
tual anthem for civil libertarians, if taken at face value, seems to say it all.
Mhe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a suffi-
cient warrant.3
But in the next paragraph Mill continues:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties ....
Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others
must be protected from their own actions as well as against external
injury."
Another passage often cited in support of the libertarian position with little
recognition of the necessary correlation between rights and competence is
Benjamin Cardozo's 1914 decision in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital:5 "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body .... ."
Coercion, and its perceived inverse, liberty, are not absolutes to be di-
vined through abstract ideological dialogues but, rather, concepts that lack
meaning out of context. Procedures evaluated in isolation reveal little about
their potential as real alternatives in any given person's situation, taking all
factors into account. These factors include prevailing cultural, social, and
economic forces, in which homelessness, abuse, and suicide are very real
possibilities.
Arguably the most important liberty speech in this nation's history was
Patrick Henry's exhortation to the Virginia Assembly in 1775 to "[g]ive me
liberty or give me death!" Fewer may know, though, that as Henry spoke
those words, his mentally disordered wife was chained in his attic, as was the
prevailing custom in Revolutionary America.! Similarly, while Abraham Lin-
2. Stephen J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment
of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54, 55 (1982).
3. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapapport ed., 1978) (1859).
4. Id.
5. 211 N.Y. 125 (1914).
6. Schloendorff, 211 N.Y. at 129 (emphasis added).
7. See HENRY MAYER, A SON OF THUNDER: PATRICK HENRY AND THE AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 245 (1991).
8. Id. at 171.
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coin is hailed as the signer of the Emancipation Proclamation, few remember
that after his death, Lincoln's son, Robert, had Mary Todd Lincoln committed
in a proceeding which included the testimony of two doctors who had never
met the woman.9
Today we do not routinely chain mentally disordered persons in attics:
involuntary civil commitment procedures entail complex economic and legal
restrictions which have significantly changed the number and character of
mentally disordered persons hospitalized or treated against their professed
wishes.' o Libertarians widely hail legal protections as victories for the rights
of the mentally disordered, but are they victories in a larger sense? The in-
creasing legalization of the way society deals with the mentally disordered
may appear to be in conflict with the clinical needs of the patient.
The law governing the mentally disordered, both civil and criminal (and
the distinction between the two is becoming increasingly blurred"), is based
on constitutional theories and implemented by attorneys trained in the criminal
defense model. 2 The criminal justice model is a poor fit for cases involving
mentally disordered persons. 3 Criminal defense attorneys are trained to rep-
resent the express wishes of their clients, and not to second guess those wishes
unless they appear so irrational that competency to proceed must be ques-
tioned. Attorneys need not consider the consequences of their actions, either
for their clients or for others. Their roles are clearly defined as adversarial,
rather than as acting in the best interests of their clients.
This adversarial role of the criminal defense attorney has been crafted
over centuries, but is based on several assumptions that are not always correct,
even when applied to defendants who are not mentally disordered. First, the
criminal defense model assumes that defendants will wish to avoid punishment
for their actions. 4 More generally, the adversarial system assumes the partici-
pation of opposing attorneys, each vigorously arguing their positions, with
"justice" the goal of the process.
While criminal prosecutions generally satisfy these assumptions, they
rarely apply in civil cases involving mentally disordered persons. Most crimi-
nal defendants do in fact want to "get off," but the motivations of mentally
disordered persons are much more complex. Clinicians are trained to look for
every motivation in their patients, while attorneys are not. In addition, the
9. Carol D. Rasnic, America's First Woman Lawyer: The Biography of Myra Bradwell, 4
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 236-37 (1995) (book review).
10. See generally ROBERT D. MILLER, INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE MENTAL-
LY ILL IN THE POST-REFORM ERA (1987).
11. See infra Part HI.C.
12. Few law schools have courses in mental health law, and most of the courses that do exist
are taught by legal professionals who lack any direct experience in the provision of mental health
care.
13. ALAN A. STONE, Psychiatric Abuse and Legal Reform: Two Ways to Make a Bad Situa-
tion Worse, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALrrY 133 (1984).
14. See generally Kenneth Appelbaum, Criminal Defendants Who Desire Punishment, 18
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 385 (1990); Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, Evalu-
ation of Competency to Stand Trial in Defendants Who Do Not Want to Be Defended Against the
Crimes Charged, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHmATRY & L. 371 (1987).
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criminal defense attorney model ignores the consequences of a "successful"
defense to persons other than the defendant, and also ignores the problems
facing an acquitted defendant. This narrow scope of representation is not a
luxury afforded clinicians. The criminal justice system, while vigorously pro-
tecting client privilege to ensure "justice," is only minimally concerned with
continuity of care, while mental health professionals must ensure that treat-
ment continues once a patient leaves a treatment facility. 5 Clinicians, particu-
larly in inpatient settings, must provide a safe and therapeutic environment for
all their patients, and cannot ignore the effects of a given patient's behavior on
other patients.
There are other significant differences in the ways in which legal and
clinical professionals approach problematic situations. Since constitutional law
typically deals with principles rather than individuals, it is often a crude in-
strument with which to deal with individual mentally disordered persons. The
law frequently abolishes a procedure or system, but rarely will the law attempt
the difficult task of modifying or establishing new and more effective systems.
In addition, legal thinking and decision-making are much more influenced by
"horror stories;"" legal arguments tend to be ideological while clinicians tend
to be concerned with all the effects of actions, and to rely more on scientific
data than on anecdotal evidence. 7 A further distinction, particularly between
legal and clinical writing, is that authors in the legal literature tend to criticize
by comparing the practices of systems they do not like with the principles of
systems of which they approve. 8
The following discussions attempt to illuminate the different sources of
coercion, types of coercion, and effects of coercion, so that the legal and clini-
cal communities can better see how to collaborate and improve the system.
II. EXTERNAL CLINICAL COERCION EXPERIENCED BY THE MENTALLY
DISORDERED
A. Hospitalization
The most often discussed aspect of the coercion of mentally disordered
persons is that of external coercion by mental health professionals. Despite the
fact that clinicians who hospitalize or treat mentally disordered persons against
their express wishes do so under color of authorizing statutes,"9 and the fact
15. See generally STONE, supra note 13; see also Leona L. Bachrach, Continuity of Care for
Chronic Mental Patients: A Conceptual Analysis, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1449 (1981); Nicholas
Stratas et al., The Future of the State Mental Hospital: Developing a Unified System of Care, 28
Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 598 (1977).
16. For a collection of "horror stories," see generally BRUCE J. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSY-
CmATRY (1972); JONAS B. ROBrrSCHER, THE POWERS OF PSYCHIATRY (1980); and Robert
Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 461 (1977).
17. See generally John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
18. See STONE, supra note 13.
19. For a detailed (if now somewhat out-of-date) review of the provisions of state civil com-
mitment statutes, see SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL Er AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d
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that most states empower law enforcement officers to initiate involuntary
hospitalization without clinical involvement, many still perceive the process as
a clinical one. Involuntary hospitalization or treatment takes place in clinical
facilities, and judicial authority is delegated to clinicians to carry out court
orders.
The perception of commitment as a primarily clinical function is valid.
Clinicians, for all practical purposes, had the sole authority for confining and
treating mentally disordered persons until the 1970s, when courts assumed
control of the process2 0 Despite the provision of most of the protections and
procedures of the criminal justice system, in practice trial court judges contin-
ue to defer to clinical judgment in many cases.2' Courts serve as gatekeepers
for involuntary commitments of mentally disordered persons in both civil and
criminal systems, but once they have determined that a person meets the com-
mitment criteria, judges relinquish day-to-day control over the conditions faced
by patients to the treating clinicians.
Historically, clinicians paid relatively little attention to the effects of clini-
cal coercion, other than to acknowledge that an adversarial relationship be-
tween clinicians and patients interfered with the trust necessary for successful
psychotherapy.' More recently, however, the MacArthur Foundation has
sponsored a series of studies on patients' perceptions of the coerciveness of
their hospitalizations.23 At a number of sites, researchers asked newly admit-
ted patients a series of questions about their experiences. Not surprisingly,
involuntary patients were more likely to feel coerced, but a significant number
of legally voluntary patients expressed similar feelings.2" A major and some-
what surprising conclusion of the studies was that many of the study subjects
expressed more concern with their perceived treatment than with the outcome
ed. 1985).
20. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to
its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the
state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dan-
gerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.
Id.; see also MILLER, supra note 10.
21. In one case in which I testified, the trial judge opined, on the record, that competency to
proceed was a clinical decision, and became upset that I wouldn't answer the difficult question in
that case for him.
22. See generally WIuxoRD OvERHoLsER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW (1953); Marc
Amaya & W. V. Burlingame, Judicial Review of Psychiatric Admissions: The Clinical Impact on
Child and Adolescent Inpatients, 20 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 761 (1981); Henry
Davidson, Mental Hospitals and the Civil Liberties Dilemma, 51 MEN. HYGIENE 371 (1966).
23. See generally Nancy S. Bennett et al., Inclusion, Motivation and Good Faith: The Mo-
rality of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission, 11 BEHAV. Sd. & L. 295 (1993); Steven K.
Hoge et al., Patient, Family, and Staff Perceptions of Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: An
Exploratory Study, 11 BEHAV. SI. & L. 281 (1993); Charles W. Lidz et al., Coercive Interactions
in a Psychiatry Emergency Room, I I BEHAV. Sd. & L. 269 (1993); Charles Lidz et al., Perceived
Coercion in Mental Hospital Admission: Pressures and Process, 52 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
1034 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion and Commitment: Understanding Involuntary Mental
Hospital Admission, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1995); John Monahan et al., Coercion to
Inpatient Treatment: Initial Results and Implications for Aggressive Treatment in the Community,
in COERCION AND AGGRESSIVE COMMUNITY TREATMENT: A NEW FRONTIER IN MENTAL HEALTH
LAW (Deborah L. Dennis & John Monahan eds., 1996).
24. See supra note 23.
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of the commitment proceedings.' The central thesis of the procedural justice
approach, as demonstrated in the studies reported, is that participants in formal
decision-making processes are often more concerned with the perceived fair-
ness of the processes than with the results. The more active a part-they are
permitted to play in the decision making, the more satisfied participants are
with the outcome.
One pr.lm .. , g...li,,, h- most of these studies is that they
involved newly admitted patients who presumably still suffered from acute and
untreated mental disorders. Positive perceptions may have resulted, in part,
from what Alan Stone has called the "thank-you" theory of treatment. Accord-
ing to Stone, patients, once treated (even against their stated wishes), acknowl-
edge that they had been sick, and thank those who had treated them.2 Stone
based his theory on clinical experience, but others-both clinicians and sociol-
ogists-have tested it, and found that the great majority of successfully treated
patients do in fact agree that involuntary hospitalization and treatment best
served their interests.' The majority of patients who did not respond well to
treatment' continued to feel negatively about their experiences.'
Voluntary hospitalization appears to be the consensus choice to avoid
coercive hospitalizations, but a number of authors argue that to describe any
such hospitalization as "voluntary" is at best misleading and, at worst, fraud.
For instance, Reed and Lewis describe the situation that arose in Chicago's
state hospitals when staff felt pressured to avoid involuntary commitment to
ensure rapid patient turnover.' In 1985, involuntary admissions to four area
hospitals constituted only one percent of total admissions, in part because staff
usually persuade patients admitted involuntarily to sign in voluntarily before
their court hearings.3
25. See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCE-
DURAL JUsTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975); E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evalu-
ations of Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 953 (1990); E.
Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Con-
cerns in Fairness Judgments, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PsYCHOLOGY 952 (1990); Tom Tyler,
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433 (1992).
26. See generally ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
(1975).
27. Sociologist Weinstein reviewed 18 quantitative studies of retrospective patient satisfac-
tion with treatment. A rather large majority of patients voiced favorable attitudes toward mental
hospitals in general as well as their own institution, and claimed that they had benefitted from
treatment. See generally Raymond Weinstein, Patient Attitudes Toward Mental Hospitalization: A
Review of Quantitative Research, 20 J. HEALTH & SOCIAL BEHAV. 237 (1979). Subsequent au-
thors have confirmed these findings. See, e.g., Virginia Aldige Hiday, Coercion in Civil Commit-
ment: Processes, Preferences, and Outcome, 15 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359 (1992); Thomas
Kalman, An Overview of Patient Satisfaction with Psychiatric Treatment, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNI-
TY PSYCHIATRY 48 (1983); J. Toews et al., Patients' Reactions to Their Commitment, 26 CANA-
DIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 251, (1981).
28. Bad responses typically involved treatment with psychiatric medications, which can be
effectively administered involuntarily.
29. See Hiday, supra note 27.
30. See generally Susan C. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission
in Chicago's State Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 137 (1990).
31. Id. at 143. Staff use persuasion/coercion (threatening commitment, despite statutory pro-
1174 [Vol. 74:4
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Anne Rogers reports that "voluntary" patients in England can be retained
after requesting discharge if staff file commitment petitions, with the result
that nearly half the patients who signed in voluntarily stated that they did not
feel that their admissions were truly voluntary.32 While some patients report-
ed that they felt internally coerced by their disorders, others said that they
signed in "voluntarily" after being threatened with commitment, and/or were
threatened with commitment if they tried to sign out before the staff thought
that they were ready. Gilboy and Schmidt report that in a majority of cases
studied, voluntary admission was used to hospitalize persons already in some
type of official custody. They argued that voluntary procedures were used
primarily for the convenience of the professionals, and enforced by threats of
commitment. Because of staffing shortages, the admitting clinician did not
have time to go through the required procedures for involuntary admission for
all patients.3 The most extreme view is that of Thomas Szasz, who argues
simply that hospitalization is not voluntary when patients are forced to sign in
under threat of commitment, or when they are not free to leave the hospital on
demand.34
While these critics argue that legally voluntary hospitalizations are in
reality coerced, they do not consider the inverse-that some legally involun-
tary admissions may in fact be voluntary: some patients have found that get-
ting themselves committed presents advantages. Many hospitals have been
forced to reduce the rate of voluntary admissions, and the lengths of stay for
those patients admitted voluntarily, frequently for purely economic reasons.
Indeed, a little-noted result of dangerousness criteria and reductions in volun-
tary admissions is that some patients now have to deliberately do something
dangerous in order to be hospitalized.33 If patients commit "dangerous" acts
that satisfy the criteria for involuntary hospitalization, they are assured admis-
sion, and get free transportation to the hospital and longer stays. Sometimes
the motivation to get oneself committed is unconscious; at other times it is
quite conscious.36 In addition, some patients recognize their need for hospital-
hibitions against such coercion); bartering (promising privileges for signatures), and stalling (ask-
ing the court for continuances to stall so that persuasion, coercion, and bartering have longer time
to work-sometimes long enough so that the patient can be discharged). "Voluntary" patients can
be retained if they request discharge by filing commitment petitions.
32. See generally Anne Rogers, Coercion and "Voluntary" Admission: An Examination of
Psychiatric Patient Views, 11 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 259 (1993).
33. See generally Janet A. Gilboy & John R. Schmidt, "Voluntary" Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 429 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Thomas Szasz, Voluntary Mental Hospitalization: An Unacknowledged Practice
of Medical Fraud, 287 NEw ENG. J. MED. 277 (1972).
35. See generally John Monahan et al., supra note 23. In my experience as an admitting
clinician, I have seen patients commit crimes deliberately in order to gain hospital admission. One
patient, realizing that her borderline personality disorder was deteriorating, arranged for herself to
be committed to prevent her from harming herself and to ensure effective treatment. Her ad-
versarial attorney argued with her to "fight" her commitment at her hearing, but (fortunately, from
the clinical from the clinical standpoint) she was still in sufficient control to reject that advice.
Such situations have been likened to "Ulysses contracts." See generally Robert Miller, Voluntary
"Involuntary" Commitment: The Briar Patch Syndrome, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
305 (1980).
36. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35. I have received calls from mentally disordered persons
asking what crimes they should commit in order to be hospitalized.
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ization, but also realize that if their conditions deteriorate, they are likely to
demand discharge and may not meet the state's criteria for commitment. I
have had patients arrange for involuntary hospitalization as a "Ulysses con-
tract,"37 to ensure that they receive the required treatment. Finally, some per-
sons will use hospitalization to avoid criminal arrest, or to build a case for
mitigation if they are arrested.
B. Seclusion and Restraint
Another major form of external coercion on mentally disordered persons
involves seclusion and restraint. Seclusion (also called "isolation") is the re-
moval of a patient from the general milieu on a ward, into a single room, with
or without a locked door. Restraint is physical restriction of movement; it is
most commonly used to restrain limbs on a specially designed bed ("four-
point" or "five-point" restraint), but can also be used to restrain a person to a
chair, or to limit movement of arms or legs ("ambulatory restraint').
The American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Seclusion and
Restraint lists three indications for using seclusion and restraint together. 1) to
prevent imminent harm to the patient or other persons where other means of
control are not effective or appropriate; 2) to prevent serious disruption of the
treatment program or significant damage to the physical environment; and 3)
to assist in treatment as part of ongoing behavior therapy. Two additional
indications exist for seclusion alone: 1) to decrease the stimulation a patient
receives; and 2) to comply with a patient's request.3s Once a patient's behav-
ior is well known to staff, restraint and/or seclusion may be used to prevent
loss of control, rather than waiting until the patient has become actively ag-
gressive.39 The Task Force cautions that seclusion should not be used when
medical conditions exist that require close monitoring, organic conditions exist
that would be exacerbated by sensory deprivation, or merely for the conve-
nience of staff.' Full (four- or five-point) restraint should not be used with-
out seclusion, to protect a patient's dignity and safety.
4'
Seclusion and restraint may also be used as part of a carefully designed
individualized treatment plan, to weaken or eliminate inappropriate aggressive
37. When Ulysses sailed past the Sirens, whose songs no man could resist, he had his men
bind him to the mast so that he could not be enticed. See THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 186 (Rich-
mond Lattimore trans., 1965). The name "Ulysses contract" has come to refer to situations in
which persons subject themselves to coercion in advance, to prevent themselves from acting
against their interests.
38. Thomas Gutheil & Kenneth Tardiff, Indications and Contraindications for Seclusion and
Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 12 (Kenneth Tardiff ed.,
1984).
39. Patients often recognize at some level that they are out of control and need to have ex-
ternal controls administered, but because of their disorders are unable to articulate those realiza-
tions. One patient that I treated kept destroying curtains in the ward day room. After each episode,
the staff secluded and briefly restrained him, which quickly calmed him down. When this pattern
became apparent, I suggested to the patient that he felt out of control at those times. He readily
agreed, and thereafter was able to ask to be secluded briefly when those feelings came on him
again.




behaviors.4 ' They are used in conjunction with reinforcing strategies for ap-
propriate behaviors, and along a continuum of less restrictive approaches.
Clinicians refer to this as "time out" rather than seclusion. In addition, physi-
cal restraint is used to prevent debilitated patients from harming themselves,
by falling out of beds or chairs, for instance. Such physical support should not
be confused with the use of restraints for behavioral control.
Since the character of the inpatient populations (particularly in public
hospitals) has changed with the dangerousness criteria,43 the commitment pro-
cess now selects for dangerous persons. Therefore a higher proportion of hos-
pitalized patients is likely to be aggressive or out of control, and thus require
some type of physical restraint. Although clinicians continue to feel that seclu-
sion is necessary, both for physical control and as part of treatment, several
studies indicate that the majority of patients who have been secluded and/or
restrained did not feel that the experience was beneficial." Those studies
must be evaluated in light of the fact that many committed patients deny ill-
ness and, thus, would also deny the need for restrictions to prevent behavior
caused by those illnesses.
Critics of the use of seclusion and restraint argue that they are used chief-
ly for the convenience of the staff or to intimidate patients. It has been dem-
onstrated '5 that when staffing is increased to more adequate levels, when staff
are given appropriate training in behavioral techniques,' and when facility
policies and external regulations are made stricter,' the use of seclusion and
restraint decreases, generally without a concomitant increase in aggression or
other behavioral problems. The fact that seclusion and restraint can (and cer-
tainly have been) abused does not mean, however, that they are not appropri-
ate when less restrictive techniques have failed. Again, one must evaluate their
use in the context of the realistic alternatives. For example, ambulatory re-
straints are still restrictive and may reduce the wearer's sense of dignity,'
42. See Robert P. Liberman & Stephen E. Wong, Behavior Analysis and Therapy Procedures
Related to Seclusion and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 35
(Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1984).
43. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
44. See generally Renee Binder & Susan McCoy, A Study of Patients' Attitudes Toward
Placement in Seclusion, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1052 (1983); Kathleen Hammill et
al., Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patient Views About Seclusion, 50 1. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 174
(1989); Robert Plutchik et al., Toward a Rationale for the Seclusion Process, 166 1. NERVOUS &
MENTAL DISEASE 571 (1978); Stanley Soliday, A Comparison of Patient and Staff Attitudes To-
ward Seclusion, 173 J. NERvOus & MENTAL DISEASE 282 (1985); Harriet Wadeson & William
Carpenter, Impact of the Seclusion Room Experience, 163 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 318
(1976).
When allowed to speak directly, ex-patients have been particularly negative about having
been secluded. See, e.g., Judi Chamberlain, An Ex-Patient's Response to Soliday, 173 J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 288 (1985).
45. See Paul H. Soloff, Historical Notes on Seclusion and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC
USES OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT 5 (Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1984).
46. See Gary Maier et al., A Comprehensive Model for Understanding and Managing Ag-
gressive Inpatients, 2 AM. J. CONTINUING EDuC. NURSING 89 (1987).
47. See, e.g., STATE OF CoLo. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERv., RULES AND REGULATIONS NOS.
108, 109 (setting forth several pages of restrictions on the use of seclusion and restraint).
48. Ambulatory restraints consist of belts attached with adjustable length leather straps lead-
ing to padded wrist cuffs. Ankle hobbles can also be used. See, e.g., Gregory Van Rybroek et al.,
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but they certainly permit more freedom and autonomy than seclusions and
four-point restraints.
C. Involuntary Administration of Psychotropic Medications
A third treatment approach for both voluntary and committed patients
involves the use of psychotropic medications. Before the civil rights reforms
of the late 1960s and 1970s, involuntarily hospitalized patients had no say
about their treatment with medications. As one federal judge said,
"Nonconsensual treatment is what commitment is all about." Before the
reforms, committed psychiatric patients automatically lost virtually all their
civil rights. They could not marry, divorce, enter into contracts, vote, or make
treatment decisions. 5 In the 1970s, however, a series of courts began to rec-
ognize that a decision that patients met criteria for involuntary hospitalization
(i.e., lacked competency to make decisions about hospitalization) did not also
determine that they lacked competency to make decisions about treatment in
the hospital.5
While patients already had, at least in theory, a right to refuse nonpsy-
chiatric medications, with the reforms, courts identified a qualified right for
involuntarily hospitalized patients to refuse psychiatric medications as well.
Courts differed on the constitutional basis for the right, but they agreed that
patients competent to make treatment decisions could not be forced to take
psychotropic medication.52 A few states53 acknowledge patients' rights to re-
fuse antipsychotic medication, but permit clinicians to determine patients'
competency.
Although these court decisions and the legislative enactments that codified
them would appear to provide significant protections for involuntary patients
(voluntary patients have an absolute right to refuse treatment, absent an emer-
gency54), in practice judges are extremely reluctant to second guess
Preventive Aggression Devices (PADS): Ambulatory Restraints as an Alternative to Seclusion, 48
J. CLINicAL PsYCHIATRY 401 (1987). In fact, in the author's experience some patients wear ambu-
latory restraints as badges of how "tough" they are.
49. Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp. 128, 131 (W.D. Wisc. 1985) (Shabaz, J.).
50. See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1198-99 nn.19-28 (1974).
51. In two early cases, Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D. NJ. 1978), and Rogers
v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), federal district court judges found that competent
patients had a constitutional right to give informed consent before being treated with ant'psychotic
medications, although they differed on the constitutional bases for the new right, and on the
procedures required to override refusal. See Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Gutheil, "Rotting with
Their Rights On": Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric
Patients, 7 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306 (1979).
52. With the exception of the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct.
1028 (1990), the overwhelming majority of state and lower federal courts have found a constitu-
tional right for competent patients to refuse nonemergent treatment. See Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at
1368. The Supreme Court, in a case involving mentally disordered prison inmates, however, held
that even competent inmates could be involuntarily medicated for their own good or for the secu-
rity needs of the prison, as long as professional judgment had been exercised (i.e., that they had
been prescribed by a physician). Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
53. See Opinion of the Justices, 465 A.2d 484 (N.H. 1983); Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1131;
Large v. Superior Ct., 714 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1986).
54. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), which not only recognized a
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psychiatrists' decisions and permit involuntary patients to refuse prescribed
treatment.5 Interestingly, contrary to the protestations of civil libertarians that
clinicians cannot make unbiased decisions in such cases, 6 one study from a
jurisdiction that permitted clinical decisionmaking revealed that clinicians al-
lowed significantly more patients to refuse medications than did tribunals in
jurisdictions requiring judicial hearings."
In addition to the purely constitutional bases for decisions to permit pa-
tients to refuse medications under certain circumstances, many legal scholars
(and some nonmedical mental health professionals as well) are convinced that
medications are unnecessary at best and poison at worst; and their views have
found their way into many court opinions.5" Much of the heat that this debate
has generated stems from erroneous concepts of what the medications do, and
from horror stories of their inappropriate use.59 A second (and also errone-
ous) assumption underlying many legal criticisms of forced medication is that
patients refuse medication chiefly because of the medications' side effects; the
research data demonstrate, however, that the majority of patients who refuse
medication do so because they deny that they are ill, rather than because of
side effects or for other reasons.'
A final legal question concerning the involuntary administration of medi-
cation is whether medications are more or less restrictive than seclusion and
restraint. There is no judicial or legislative consensus on this question, and
legal scholars also disagree.6 What is clear, unfortunately, is that few courts
constitutional right for voluntary patients to refuse medications in nonemergency situations, but
explicitly held that the hospital could not discharge voluntary patients merely because they refused
treatment considered essential by their treaters. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1368.
55. Studies report that in between 90% and 100% of cases, judges override patients' refusals.
See Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient
Population: Six-month Review, 17 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989).
56. In Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976), the court opined that "the
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness leave too much to subjective choices by less than neutral
individuals" to serve as the basis for the loss of liberty involved in civil commitment Id. at 1135.
57. Julie M. Zito et al., The Treatment Review Panel: A Solution to Treatment Refusal?, 12
BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L. 349 (1984). The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Price v.
Sheppard, 307 Minn. 250, 262-63 (1976), ultimately rejected clinical decision-making and re-
quired judicial hearings. Fewer patients were then permitted to refuse medications. Personal Com-
munication with William H. Routt, M.D. (Apr. 24, 1984).
58. See Plotkin, supra note 16; Thomas Zander, Prolixin Decanoate: Big Brother by Injec-
tion?, 5 J. PSYCHATRY & L. 55 (1977).
59. For an antidote to the misinformation that characterizes much of the legal literature on
the subject, see generally Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Control," "Synthetic
Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsy-
chotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983).
60. See generally Xavier Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and
Schizoaffective and Mood Disorders, 51 ARCIUVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 826 (1994); William
Michaux, Side Effects, Resistance and Dosage Deviation in Psychiatric Outpatients Treated with
Tranquilizers, 133 J. NERvoUS & MENTAL DISEASE 203 (1961); Allen Raskin, A Comparison of
Acceptors and Resistors of Drug Treatment As an Adjunct to Psychotherapy, 25 J. CONSULTING
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 366 (1961); Harold I. Schwartz et al., Autonomy and the Right to Refuse
Treatment: Patients' Attitudes After Involuntary Medication, 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCMIA-
TRY 1049 (1988); Theodore Van Putten et al., Drug Refusal in Schizophrenia and the Wish to Be
Crazy, 33 ARcHIvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1443 (1976); Theodore Van Putten, Why Do Schizophren-
ic Patients Refuse to Take Their Drugs?, 31 ARCHUVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 67 (1974).
61. Law professor George Dix feels that medication is the more restrictive. George Dix,
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have considered the therapeutic effects of either treatment modality. Clinicians,
as well as the majority of patients, prefer medications unless the time neces-
sary for them to become effective is too long to manage an acute crisis. There
is a correlation between the two approaches, however; studies demonstrate that
when patients are granted the right to refuse medication, the use of seclusion
and restraint goes up, at least initially.62
Ill. EXTERNAL LEGAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
The types of coercion discussed in the previous section exist under the
authority of law, but in these cases, courts delegate the implementation of the
law to clinicians, the majority of whom accept the responsibility in order to be
able to provide treatment for severely disordered patients. This section discuss-
es situations in which social and/or economic pressures, as implemented
through laws, coerce mentally disordered persons. As the coercion is indirect,
it generally goes unnoticed, particularly by libertarians, who focus chiefly on
direct governmental coercion. And unlike the types of clinically motivated
coercion discussed in Part II above, mental health professionals do not support
much of this coercion, considering it antitherapeutic.
A. Involuntary Commitment
As discussed above, mental health professionals have utilized involuntary
hospitalization, and more recently involuntary commitment to outpatient treat-
ment,63 to provide effective treatment to patients whose mental disorders pre-
vent them from seeking treatment on their own. But there are a growing num-
ber of situations in which the law coerces mentally disordered persons in non-
therapeutic ways which clinicians generally oppose.
The first such change was the advent of dangerousness requirements for
involuntary hospitalization. In reaction to the perception that clinicians exerted
too much control over the involuntary commitment process-which utilized
clinical criteria-courts and legislatures in the 1970s added a requirement that
patients be dangerous to themselves or to others before they could be hospital-
ized against their stated wishes. Immediately, critics of involuntary hospital-
Legal and Ethical Issues in the Treatment and Handling of Violent Behavior, in CLINICAL TREAT-
MENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 178 (Loren Roth ed., 1984). Clinician Paul
Soloff disagrees. Paul Soloff, Physical Control: The Role of Seclusion and Restraint in Modern
Psychiatric Practice, in CLINICAL TREATMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON, 119
(1984).
62. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric
Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340 (1980); Miller et al., supra note 55.
63. See geneially ROBERT MILLER, ET AL., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION TASK
FORCE REPORT No. 26, INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO OUrPATIENT TREATMENT (1987); see
also Gustavo A. Fernandez & Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on
the Revolving-Door Syndrome in North Carolina, 41 HOsp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1001
(1990);' Virginia Aldige Hiday & Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with
Outpatient Commitment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215 (1987); Robert
Miller, Outpatient Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: An Overview and an Update, 6 BEHAV.
Sd. & L. 99 (1988).
64. See generally MILLER, supra note 10. While no final court has required dangerousness as
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ization or treatment, who had been notably responsible for the added criteria,
reacted by attacking mental health professionals for their lack of ability to
predict future dangerousness.'
The advent of dangerousness criteria has had an impact on the character
of persons committed, but not necessarily in the way intended by their cre-
ators. While a number of mentally disordered persons who would previously
have been committed no longer are,' a number of demonstrably dangerous
but questionably mentally disordered persons, who would not have been com-
mitted before the "reforms," are now being committed. With commitment
based largely on dangerousness, psychiatric facilities, particularly public hospi-
tals, are filling up with aggressive and frequently untreatable "patients."67 Not
only do such persons require more restrictive measures that take staff time
away from treatable patients, but they frequently intimidate the more tradi-
tional psychiatric patients and directly interfere with their treatment. Thus, the
laws that were intended to protect mentally disordered persons have actually
forced many of them to be hospitalized in facilities that are less safe and less
therapeutic than prior to reforms.
Another unforeseen complication introduced by the dangerousness criteria
was noted by the Supreme Court in a 1990 case, Zinermon v. Burch.' In
considering the necessity for informed consent for voluntary psychiatric hospi-
talization, the Court majority held in dicta that "[p]ersons who are mentally ill
a criterion for involuntary commitment, a number of judges have rejected the existing need-for-
treatment criteria as being too vague and too broad, and have approved dangerousness criteria.
See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum, Is the Need for Treatment Constitutionally Acceptable as a Basis for
Civil Commitment?, 12 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 144 (1984).
65. The most colorful of such attacks is Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693 (1974).
A more balanced assessment can be found in the writings of Professor Monahan. See, e.g., JOHN
MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES (1981).
Monahan points out that dangerousness cannot be accurately predicted without considering the
context in which the person acts. See generally, John Monahan, Prediction Research and the
Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 198 (1978). Most early studies involved predicting community behavior of patients who
had been hospitalized for years; those studies demonstrably overpredicted violent behavior. The
American Psychiatric Association, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981), argued that while psychiatrists could accurately predict short-term danger-
ousness, they could not predict the type of very long-term behavior called for in capital sentencing
hearings. Id. at 472 (citing, among others, brief for the American Psychiatric Association as Ami-
cus Curiae 11-17). The Supreme Court rejected this argument on policy grounds, ignoring the re-
search data presented. Id. at 472-73. More recently, short-term studies during the initial period of
hospitalization have proved significantly more accurate. See generally Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al.,
Psychiatrists' Accuracy in Predicting Violent Behavior on an Inpatient Unit, 39 HOSP. & COMMU-
NrIY PSYCHIATRY 1090 (1988); Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judg-
ments of Dangerousness in Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197 (1987);
Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Relationship Between Preadmission Threats and Later Vio-
lent Behavior by Acute Psychiatric Inpatients, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PsYCHIATRY 605 (1989);
Steven P. Segal et al., Civil Commitment in the Psychiatric Emergency Room: . The Assessment
of Dangerousness by Emergency Room Clinicians, 45 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 748 (1988); Ken-
neth Tardiff, A Model for the Short-term Prediction of Violent Potential, in CURRENT APPROACH-
ES TO THE PREDICTION OF VIOLENCE (David A. Brizer & Martha Crowner eds., 1989).
66. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
67. See generally John Oldham & Andrew E. Skodol, Personality Disorders in the Public
Sector, 42 Hosp. & COMMUNIrY PSYCHIATRY 481 (1991).
68. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
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and incapable of giving informed consent to admission would not necessarily
meet the statutory standard for involuntary placement." Under the current
rule of law, patients seeking hospitalization, but incapable because of their
mental disorders of giving truly informed consent and not dangerous enough




Marc Abramson coined the term "criminalization of the mentally ill" in
1972."' He observed that as a result of more restrictive civil commitment
laws, more mentally disordered persons are arrested and placed in the criminal
justice system. Some have used the term to refer to the application of the pro-
cedural protections of the criminal justice system to persons at risk for civil
commitment.72
Taking the latter defimition first, in addition to the grafting of dangerous-
ness criteria onto the substantive criteria for involuntary hospitalization, the
same reforms addressed procedural issues as well. Commitment hearings,
although held in court, rarely provided any of the protections afforded other
groups facing loss of liberty. Federal courts required that respondents facing
involuntary hospitalization be provided with all the protections provided to
criminal defendants who also face loss of liberty.7" The most significant com-
ponent of these changes was the requirement for active, adversarial attorneys
representing respondents.
Concerning the first definition, there continues to be controversy about
whether, in fact, mentally disordered persons are increasingly likely to be pro-
cessed through the criminal justice system rather than the mental health sys-
tem. 74 One problem is that most studies lack a baseline-i.e., most reports of
69. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 133.
70. See Robert Miller, Zinermon v. Burch: No Entrance?, 15 NEWSL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHi-
ATRY & L. 37 (1990).
71. Marc Abramson, The Criminalization of Mentally Disordered Behavior: Possible Side
Effect of a New Mental Health Law, 23 HOsP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCMIATRY 101, 101 (1972).
72. See generally John Monahan, The Psychiatrization of Criminal Behavior: A Reply, 24
Hosp. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY 105 (1973) (responding to Abramson's article).
73. The first major decision was Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (E.D. Wisc.
1972). Another decision highly critical of the existing clinical dominance in involuntary hospital-
ization was Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976).
74. Sociologist Linda Teplin has done much of the methodologically sound research in this
field; her data support the hypothesis that more mentally disordered persons were being arrested
after passage of reform commitment laws, although not to the extent reported by others. See gen-
erally Linda A. Teplin, The Criminalization of the Mentally Ill: Speculation in Search of Data, 94
PSYCHOL. BULL. 54 (1983); Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative
Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794 (1984) [hereinafter Teplin,
Criminalizing Mental Disorder]; Linda A. Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Danger-
ous Misconception, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 593 (1985); see also Jennifer C. Bonovitz & Jay S.
Bonovitz, Diversion of the Mentally Ill into the Criminal Justice System: The Police Intervention
Perspective, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 973 (1981); M. Borzecki & J. Wormith, The Criminalization
of Psychiatrically Ill People: A Review with a Canadian Perspective, 10 PSYCHIATRIC J. U. OTrA-
WA 241 (1985); Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites": Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, 3 HILLSIDE J.
CLINICAL PsYCHIATRY 123 (1979). But see Virginia A. Hiday, Civil Commitment and Arrests: An
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significant numbers of mentally disordered persons in jails and prisons do not
have data predating the advent of restrictive civil commitment laws. Regard-
less of etiology, however, large numbers of mentally disordered persons are in
fact being jailed, often for misdemeanors which would have led to hospitaliza-
tion rather than arrest before commitment required overt dangerousness.75
Police officers, frustrated at the refusal of the mental health system to accept
responsibility for mentally disordered misdemeanants, have learned to "go
straight to jail," rather than even taking such persons to hospital emergency
rooms.76 As a result of these policies, the largest collection of incarcerated
mentally disordered persons in history is now the Los Angeles County Jail
system, with nearly 20,000 such admissions a year, far more than the largest
state hospital ever held.' Table One demonstrates the distribution of mentally
disordered persons who are currently involuntarily detained in Colorado.
TABLE ONE
COMMITED/INCARCERATED MENTALLY ILL ADULTS IN COLORADO
Site Legal Status Census
Colo. MHI Ft. Logan Civil Certification 91
Denver General Civil Certification 22
Univ. of Colorado Civil Certification 24
Colo. MI Pueblo Civil Certification 107
Colo. MHI Pueblo Forensic 308
Jails Correctional 980
Dep't of Corrections Correctional - SMI 734"
Dep't of Corrections Correctional - on meds 945
' based on projected increases since 1993 Fuller-Torrey report of 534.
When the mentally disordered break the law and their arrests and convic-
tions involve the full panoply of procedural protections, their incarcerations
Investigation of the Criminalization Thesis, 180 J. NERvOUS & MENTAL DiSEASE 184 (1992).
Professor Hiday's data, from following 1,226 involuntarily hospitalized patients, demonstrated that
those patients who were arrested were not generally charged with the minor crimes that the
criminalization hypothesis predicts. Id.
75. See Abramson, supra note 71; see also H. Richard Lamb & Robert William Grant, The
Mentally III in an Urban County Jail, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 17 (1982); Steve Stelovich,
From the Hospital to the Prison: A Step Forward in Deinstitutionalization?, 30 HOSP. & COMMU-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 618 (1979). Several authors have explained the increased arrest rates for men-
tally disordered persons on the basis of overrepresentation by a small number of patients with
prior histories of arrests. See Larry Sosowsky, Crime and Violence Among Mental Patients Recon-
sidered in View of the New Legal Relationship Between the State and the Mentally Ill, 135 AM. J.
PsYcHIATY 33 (1978); Henry Steadman et al., Explaining the Increased Arrest Rate Among Men-
tal Patients: The Changing Clientele of State Hospitals, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 816 (1978).
76. See Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder, supra note 74.
77. In 1955, there were 559,000 patients in state mental hospitals (virtually the only hospi-
tals for involuntarily committed patients at that time). It has since fallen to under 100,000, al-
though many psychiatric patients are in general hospitals or in nursing/rest homes. See GERALD N.
GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS AND AMERICAN SOCIErY 1875-1940 316 (1983).
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appear justified under the state's police power. Civil libertarians would seem-
ingly have little cause for concern. But what is the effect on the mentally dis-
ordered persons themselves of this "protection"? Despite the evidence that at
least some prefer jail to hospitals,78 few jails have the resources with which
to provide adequate treatment for mental disorders.79 Patients in prisons fare
somewhat better than their counterparts in jails, chiefly as a result of law suits,
and because lamer systems can provide more resources. But mentally disor-
dered inmates are at a significant disadvantage in correctional facilities. Their
behavior exposes them to ridicule at best and abuse at worst, from both other
inmates and from guards. They are more frequently placed in maximum secu-
rity facilities, are systematically denied placements at minimum security facili-
ties, and are denied the opportunity to reduce their sentences significantly by
participation in boot camp programs.80
Placement in correctional facilities drastically compromises continuity of
care for such persons. The majority of community mental health centers do
not, as a matter of policy, provide mental health services to inmates in local
jails, although there is evidence that this situation is changing gradually.8
When mentally disordered persons are released from jails and, especially, from
prisons, local treatment facilities frequently refuse to provide aftercare services
for them. This refusal, in turn, often delays release, because parole boards are
reluctant to release such inmates unless effective treatment is available to con-
trol mental disorders, and thus minimize recidivism.
An apparent paradox should be noted here. The criminal justice system is
antitherapeutic for most patients whose serious mental disorders prevent them
from being able to control their behaviors. However, patients with personality
disorders are able to exercise such control, albeit with more difficulty than
nondisordered persons. Several authors have argued that prosecuting or credi-
bly threatening to prosecute such persons is actually therapeutic, by setting ex-
ternal limits that reinforce the appropriate assumption of responsibility. 2
When clinicians, particularly those practicing in hospitals, attempt to use this
approach, however, they are typically met with massive resistance from the
78. Most preferences for jail are due to denial of illness, but some are due to realistic esti-
mates of the time that will be spent incarcerated. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
79. For a methodologically detailed survey of selected jails, see generally HENRY J.
STEADMAN ET AL., THE MENTALLY ILL IN JAIL: PLANNING FOR ESSENTIAL SERvIcES (1989). For
a more polemic account that reports data from every state, see E. FULLER TORREY ET AL.,
CRIuMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS
(1992).
80. See, e.g., Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional Facil-
ities, 22 BULL. AM. ACADEMY PSYCHIATRY & L. 621 (1994).
81. See generally STEADMAN Er AL., supra note 79.
82. See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, A Model Hospital Policy on Prose-
cuting Patients for Presumptively Criminal Acts, 42 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1233
(1991); S. Kenneth Hoge & Thomas G. Gutheil, The Prosecution of Psychiatric Patients for As-
saults on Staff. A Preliminary Empirical Study, 38 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 44 (1987);
Robert D. Miller & Gary J. Maier, Factors Affecting the Decision to Prosecute Mental Patients
for Criminal Behavior, 38 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 50 (1987); Linda Phelan et al.,
Prosecuting Psychiatric Patients for Assault, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 581 (1985);
Leonard I. Stein & Ronald J. Diamond, The Chronic Mentally Ill and the Criminal Justice System:
When to Call the Police, 36 HoSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 271 (1985).
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criminal justice system. Many prosecutors apparently believe acting out pa-
tients are "right where they belong" and decline to press charges. 3
C. Forced Evaluation and Treatment in the Criminal Justice System
The public perceives that criminal defendants who "plead" incompetence
to proceed, or plead insanity, have gotten away with something, 4 and the
tensions between legal and therapeutic interests are quite evident in three
settings within the criminal justice system. First, criminal defendants may be
incompetent to proceed, in which case the appropriate length of commitment
presents problems. Second, the relationship between the insanity defense and
the length of commitment or imprisonment has not been resolved. Third, re-
cent attempts to tie incarceration to the successful completion of treatment
programs raised even more questions.
The criminal law permits (indeed requires) defendants whose competency
to proceed is in question for any reason to be psychiatrically evaluated before
trial. Historically, defendants found incompetent to proceed could be (and fre-
quently were) hospitalized indefinitely, regardless of the nature of the criminal
charges against them; as a result, the issue of incompetence was generally
raised by prosecutors rather than defense attorneys. After the Supreme Court's
1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana,"5 most states limited the length of con-
finement to the maximum term of imprisonment for the crime(s) charged.
With prosecutors charging the most severe crimes, and given no opportunity to
plea bargain charges until a defendant is found competent to proceed, the
maximum period of commitment is typically tied to that of the most serious
crime charged." In addition, the majority of pretrial forensic evaluations are
still carried out in inpatient facilities, so that defendants who would otherwise
be free on bond are incarcerated during the evaluation period, which can be a
number of months. That incarceration, in most states, is effected in maximum
security forensic hospitals, in which the environment and clientele are largely
indistinguishable from those found in jails, in spite of the fact that the staffing
reflects a hospital rather than a correctional facility."
Insanity is conceptualized legally as an affirmative defense in those forty-
83. See supra note 82.
84. See generally HENRY J. STEADMAN, BEATING A RAP?: DEFENDANTS FOUND INCOMPE-
TENT TO STAND TRIAL (1979).
85. 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
86. For this reason, Professor Norval Morris, among others, has argued that when significant
procedural issues exist, or when a defense on the merits has a high probability of success, states
should permit incompetent defendants to proceed to trial. If convicted, then the trial judge should
conduct a retrospective determination of the effects of the defendant's incompetency on the con-
viction. See generally Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposal for the Abolition of the Incom-
petency Plea, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 66 (1972). The American Bar Association (ABA) does not go so
far, but has recommended that "Ithe fact that the defendant has been determined to be incompe-
tent to stand trial should not preclude further judicial action, defense motions or discovery pro-
ceedings which may fairly be conducted without the personal participation of the defendant."
AMERICAN BAR Assoc., CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS Standard 7-4.12
(1984).
87. See generally Robert D. Miller & Edward J. Germain, Inpatient Evaluation of Compe-
tency to Stand Trial, 9 HEALTH L. IN CANADA 74 (1989).
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seven jurisdictions in the United States that retain the defense.8 While other
affirmative defenses, such as duress, must in practice be entered by competent
defendants on their own behalves, at least seventeen jurisdictions permit insan-
ity defenses to be entered over the active objections of defendants; in twelve
of those jurisdictions it can be imposed on defendants who are judged compe-
tent to proceed. 9 Since, contrary to popular belief, commitment of defendants
found insane frequently exceeds the terms of imprisonment which would have
been imposed with a guilty verdict," such legal coercion, which by definition
can only be imposed on mentally disordered defendants, sacrifices the rights
and autonomy of competent defendants to protect the dignity of the law.
While mental health professionals are of necessity involved in the evalua-
tion and treatment of defendants found incompetent to proceed and not guilty
by reason of insanity, these systems were created by the law, not by mental
health professionals, who have opposed the use of mental health commitments
for purposes other than the provision of treatment. Unlike the situation with
involuntary hospitalization, in which clinicians have the authority (and often
are required) to discharge patients when they no longer require hospitalization
for treatment, patients hospitalized under the criminal laws can generally be
discharged only by courts, who are under increasing political pressure not to
release mentally disordered persons who have committed serious crimes, re-
gardless of the current mental status of the perpetrator.'
Another legal innovation, crafted in response to public outrage at the
insanity defense, is the verdict of guilty but mentally ill (GBMI). Under this
verdict, defendants adjudged mentally ill at the time of commission of the
criminal act, but not sufficiently ill to meet the criteria for the insanity de-
fense, can be found GBMI. Such defendants are sentenced to criminal punish-
ment, just like any other convicted person. These defendants are supposed to
88. See, e.g., Barbara A. Weiner, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56
CM.-KENT L. REV. 1057, 1057 (1980).
89. See Robert D. Miller et a., Forcing the Insanity Defense on Unwilling Defendants: Best
Interests and the Dignity of the L.aw, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 487 (1996).
90. The research data conflict on this point. The earliest studies, before due process reforms
affected the commitments of insanity acquittees, indicated that insanity acquittees and felons con-
victed of the same crimes spent comparable periods of time incarcerated. See generally MARK
PANTLE Er AL., COMPARING INDIvIDuAL PERIODS AND SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS OF INSANITY
ACQUITFEEs AND CONvICTED FELONS (1980) (analyzing data from 1965-197 1). Later studies, after
the libertarian reforms, indicated that convicted felons were locked up longer, see, e.g., Richard A.
Pasewark et al., Detention and Rearrest Rates of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity
and Convicted Felons, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 892 (1982) (analyzing data from 1971-1973);
Betty L. Phillips & Richard A. Pasewark, Insanity Plea in Connecticut, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSY-
cmATRY & L. 335 (1980) (analyzing data from 1970-1972). As the "law and order" mentality
gained ascendancy, the trends in many states changed back to longer commitments for insanity
acquittees. See generally Grant T. Harris et al., Length of Detention in Matched Groups of Insani-
ty Acquittees and Convicted Offenders, 14 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 223 (1991) (analyzing data
from 1975-1981); Mark Pogrebin et al., Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Research Note, 8
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 237 (1986) (analyzing data from 1980-1983).
91. See generally Abraham L. Halpem et al., New York's Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1980: A Forensic Psychiatric Perspective, 45 ALB. L. REV. 661 (1981); see also Robert D. Miller
et al., Judicial Oversight Over Release of Patients Committed After Being Found Not Competent




receive mental health treatment, but courts have held that they are entitled to
no more treatment than any other inmate. 92
Michigan initially created the GBMI verdict in response to a state court
decision that freed a number of insanity acquittees.93 The verdict was specifi-
cally designed as an alternative to the insanity defense, with the hope that
many mentally disordered defendants would be imprisoned rather than hospi-
talized (and subsequently released sooner than if they had gone to prison).94
Eleven other states followed suit, most following the Hinckley verdict.9 Al-
though there is some evidence that the verdict has in fact reduced the number
of insanity defenses in two states," the overwhelming majority of the data
indicate that there is little change in the overall number of insanity acquittals.
Most authors have been critical of the defense, reporting that it does not re-
duce insanity defenses, and disadvantages those found GBMI relative to those
simply found guilty.'
92. See INGO KEILITZ ET AL., THE GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL
STUDY 1-50 (1984).
93. In People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511 (1974), the Michigan Supreme Court held that
the state must release defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity unless they met criteria for
involuntary hospitalization at the time of sentencing. After that ruling, trial courts determined that
a number of acquittees did not meet this requirement, and thus released them. See Lynn Blunt &
H. Stock, Guilty but Mentally Ill: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SC1. & L. 49 (1985).
94. Many authors have been critical of the Michigan experience. See, e.g., Lynn W. Blunt &
Harley W. Stock, Guilty but Mentally III: An Alternative Verdict, 3 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 49 (1985);
John Klofas & Ralph Weisheit, Pleading Guilty but Mentally Ill: Adversarial Justice and Mental
Health, 9 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 491 (1986); Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, Evaluating
Michigan's Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77
(1982). These authors report that insanity defenses did not decrease, that GBMI inmates did not
receive increased mental health services (and indeed did not need them), and that GBMI inmates
were not paroled as early as defendants convicted of the same crimes without the GBMI label.
Petrella and his colleagues criticized these conclusions, pointing out that the McQuillan
decision, and the change from McNaghten to ALl criteria for insanity, might have combined to
increase the number of insanity pleas and, therefore, the fact that the actual number of successful
pleas remained constant after introduction of the GBMI plea indicates that the number would have
gone up but for the new verdict. These detractors acknowledge Smith and Hall's observation that
the guilty but mentally ill inmates did not resemble insanity acquittees, but attempt to explain it
away by noting that no data indicate what percentage of those pleading guilty but mentally ill
would have pled insane in the absence of the alternative verdict. See Russell C. Petrella et a.,
Examining the Application of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HOSP. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCHIATRY 254 (1985).
95. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (Michie 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-47 (Supp.
1983) (repealed 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 401(b), 408 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-
131 (Supp. 1993); 38 ILL. CoMp. STAT. § 5/115-2(b) (West 1993); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (Supp.
1982); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.120 (Michie Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Michie
Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFED LAws § 23a-7-2
(Michie Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983). Nevada recently abolished its
insanity defense and replaced it with a GBMI statute. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.041 (Michie
1995).
96. See generally R.D. MacKay & J. Kopelman, The Operation of the "Guilty but Mentally
Ill" Verdict in Pennsylvania, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 247 (1988). Insanity defenses in Alaska
dropped from six to one in the year following enactment of a GBMI statute, but at the same time
the insanity criteria were made more restrictive. See, e.g., INGO KEILrTZ ET AL., THE GUILTY BUT
MENTALLY ILL VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (1984).
97. See generally KEiL ET AL., supra note 96, Linda C. Fentiman, "Guilty but Mentally
Ill": The Real Verdict is Guilty, 26 B.C. L. REv. 601 (1985); Klofas & Weisheit, supra note 94;
Donald W. Morgan et al., Guilty but Mentally Ill: The South Carolina Experience, 16 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 41 (1988); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An
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Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in another state method
of incarcerating allegedly mentally disordered persons---the mentally disor-
dered sex offender (MDSO) laws. In the 1950s, a number of states passed
MDSO laws, but as alternatives to criminal imprisonment. Commitment under
these laws was initially indeterminate, because it was tied to treatment rather
than to an arbitrary fixed term of punishment. The laws were attacked in the
1970s on civil rights grounds, as well as because of lack of evidence of treat-
ment effectiveness, and most were repealed or fell into disuse.98 In the late
1980s, however, public fears about criminals in general and sex offenders in
particular resulted in the passage of new MDSO laws in several states."
Unlike the previous laws, however, the new wave of statutes provides for
"civil" commitment of sex offenders after they have served criminal sentences
for the same crimes that serve as the basis of predictions that they will commit
future sex crimes. Two of these laws are currently before the federal courts.
Washington State's Sexually Violent Predator statute was upheld by its state
supreme court,"m but found to be unconstitutional by the federal district
court.' ' Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator law"m was found unconsti-
tutional by its state supreme court,"°3 but on appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed." The third, Wisconsin's Sexual Predator Law, was upheld by its





Unlike the insanity defense and commitments for treatment to restore
competency to proceed, mental health professionals have opposed sexual pred-
ator laws, recognizing them for what they are: a return to indefinite commit-
ments in a (not so) covert attempt to alleviate public fear of sex offenders, not
to provide adequate time for treatment;' 6 an incapacitation of offenders,
cloaked in the appearance of beneficence. The American Psychiatric Associa-
tion and its district branches have provided amicus briefs to the courts in all
three states opposing the laws." If the duty to protect third parties turns cli-
nicians into cops, sexual predator statutes turn them into gaolers,"M and ulti-
mately the system selects for the kinds of clinicians who are comfortable in
being gaolers.
Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 494 (1985); The Insanity De-
fense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DIsABILITY L. REP. 136 (1983).
98. See Barbara A. Weiner, Sexual Psychopath Laws, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAW 739-43 (Samuel Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985).
99. John G. LaFond, Washington's Novel Sexual Predator Commitment Law, 18(1) NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 4 (1993).
100. In re Young, 122 Wash. 2d 1(1993).
101. Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
102. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29(a)(01) to 29(a)(15) (1995).
103. In re Hendricks, 259 Kan. 246 (1996).
104. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. CL 2072 (1997).
105. State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis. 2d 252 (1995), cert. denied sub nom., Schmidt v. Wiscon-
sin, 117 S. CL 2507 (1997); State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279 (1995), cert. denied sub nom., Post v.
Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 2507 (1997).
106. The Kansas statute defines MDSOs as untreatable. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995).
107. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1996).
108. The obsolete form of this word is used here on purpose, to suggest the regressive think-
ing that supports sexually violent predator laws.
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D. Paternalistic Advocates and Attorneys
Mental health professionals have been (accurately) accused of being pater-
nalistic towards their patients,"m believing that the provision of effective
treatment11° justifies temporary restriction of external physical liberty for
those patients incompetent to make treatment decisions." Less discussed in
the literature, however, is that many self-appointed advocates for the mentally
ill are just as paternalistic, valuing liberty and due process at the expense of
treatment.'12
Just as clinicians utilize the existing laws to impose treatment on patients,
these advocates frequently use their authority to undermine it. Many advo-
cates, particularly when hospital-based advocacy programs were in their infan-
cies, took the position that clinicians were their enemies, and adopted a strictly
adversarial posture toward hospital staffs. Appalled at the conditions in some
hospitals, concerned only that their clients-who had no more choice about
their advocates than about their treaters-be granted "freedom" from physical
restraint, and rejecting the proposition that psychiatric treatment conferred any
benefit, many argued against the use of involuntary hospitalization or treat-
ment under any circumstances." 3 Few of these early advocates had any clini-
cal training or sophistication, and they operated from the criminal defense at-
torney model, which teaches concentration on one client at a time, to the ex-
clusion of all others. As a consequence, protection of the legal rights of one
patient often resulted in loss of the same rights for others. Mental health pro-
fessionals do not have the luxury of such tunnel vision; they are responsible
for the safety and treatment of all their patients.
Patricia Wald and Paul Friedman have classified advocates into "rights-
oriented" and "treatment-oriented."' " The former are those who concentrate
only on patients' legal rights (as interpreted by the advocates), while the latter
use their advocacy skills to improve patients' access to effective treatment.
The rights-oriented advocates would prefer to abolish all involuntary treatment,
109. See generally Robert D. Miller, Involuntary Civil Commitment: Legal Versus Clinical
Paternalism, in LEGAL ENCROACHMENTS IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE, NEw DIRECTIONS FOR MEN-
TAL HEALTH SERVICES (Stephen Rachlin ed., 1985).
110. A plethora of studies have demonstrated the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication.
Most significant, several studies demonstrate that this efficacy is the same for voluntary and invol-
untary patients. See Donald R. Gorham & Lewis J. Sherman, The Relation of Attitude Toward
Medication to Treatment Outcomes in Chemotherapy, 118 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 830 (1961); Gerard
Hogarty & Solomon Goldberg, The NIMH Collaborative Group, Drug and Psychotherapy in the
Aftercare of Schizophrenic Patients: One-Year Relapse Rates, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 54
(1973); National Inst. of Mental Health Psychopharmacology Serv. Ct. Collaborative Study
Group, Phenothiazine Treatment in Acute Schizophrenia, 10 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 246
(1964).
111. See supra notes 51-52; see also Miller, supra note 109. The sociological data reported
supra note 27 also supports the view that after effective treatment, the majority of patients feel
that the temporary restriction of their rights was justified.
112. See generally Morse, supra note 2.
113. See generally H. Richard Lamb, Securing Patients' Rights-Responsibly, 32 HosP. &
COMMuNirrY PSYCHIATRY 393 (1981); Alan Stone, The Myth of Advocacy, 30 HosP. & CoMMu-
NITY PSYCHIATRY 819 (1979).
114. See generally Patricia Wald & Paul Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy
in the United States, I INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137 (1978).
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but understanding that they are unlikely to accomplishing this goal, they fre-
quently use litigation as a means to implement their covert agendas. A leading
example can be found in the landmark "right-to-treatment" law suit, Wyatt v.
Stickney,"5 in which lead counsel for the plaintiff made it plain that he was
not particularly interested in improving treatment in Alabama's substandard
hospitals for the mentally ill and mentally retarded, but rather hoped to force
the state to discharge as many "inmates" as possible."6 Activist attorneys
have not only tried to close hospitals, but also to prevent mentally disordered
persons from seeking to stay in them voluntarily or to gain access to them.
The majority of attorneys who actually represent persons facing civil
commitment in court do not share the activist agenda of the hospital-based
advocates and members of the national mental health bar."7 In fact, many
are quite reluctant to adopt a full adversarial stance with respect to their cli-
ents, preferring a "best interests" role because of the obvious mental disorders
from which their clients suffer."s One example of this paternalism is the use
of plea bargaining techniques learned from criminal defense work. Many attor-
neys, convinced that their clients will be hospitalized as a result of their hear-
ings, argue for a less restrictive alternative-commitment to outpatient treat-
ment--even if neither their clients nor the hospital staff approve of that alter-
native. Unlike the situation in criminal court, such attorneys frequently enter
such compromise pleas over the strenuous objections of their clients." 9 Some
advocates have actually filed suit to prevent their "clients" from receiving
potentially effective treatment. 2
115. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
116. The lead plaintiff's attorney in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
wrote:
Indeed the strategy in a case like Wyatt is to make it too expensive to run large mental
institutions and encourage the development of non-institutional alternatives.... In re-
cent years, right-to-treatment litigation has emerged as a potent new tool to attack the
system by which the mentally ill are confined against their will and incarcerated indefi-
nitely.
Lawrence Schwartz, Litigating the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 25 Hosp. & CoMMU-
Nrry PSYcHIATRY 460, 461 (1974).
117. See Lawrence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned
to Hate the Adversary System, 6 J. PsYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1978). Norman Poythress, an expen-
enced forensic psychologist, attempted to train attorneys to represent commitment respondents
effectively, but reported that his efforts had little impact on their "best interests" philosophy. Nor-
man G. Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise of Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to Cope with
Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 1 (1978).
118. In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wisc. 1982), a federal district court held
that individuals facing commitment were constitutionally entitled to counsel acting in an adver-
sarial role and as advocates for freedom. Id. at 1090 ("Mhe interests in avoiding civil commit-
ment are at least as high as those of persons accused of criminal offenses.") One attorney has ex-
pressed his frustration with the adversarial role in civil commitment hearings in print. See Law-
rence P. Galie, An Essay on the Civil Commitment Lawyer: Or How I Learned to Hate the Adver-
sary System, 6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 71 (1978).
Poythress and colleagues have attempted to train attorneys to represent respondents facing
commitment in an adversarial fashion, but found little change from the usual "best interests" role
after the training. Norman G. Poythress Jr., Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training
Attorneys to Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 LAW & HUM: BEHAv. 1 (1978).
119. See generally Robert D. Miller, The Use of Plea Bargaining in Involuntary Civil Com-
mitment, 7 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 395 (1984).
120. In Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dept. of Mental Health, 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
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Recently, David Wexler and Bruce Winick, two law professors experi-
enced in both mental health law and practice, have been advocating a concept
they call "therapeutic jurisprudence."'' Professor Wexler has written that
"[t]he task of therapeutic jurisprudence is to identify-and ultimately to exam-
ine empirically-relationships between legal arrangements and therapeutic out-
comes."' 22 He goes on to state that it involves four overlapping areas of in-
quiry: 1) the role of the law in producing psychological dysfunction; 2) the
therapeutic aspects of legal rules; 3) the therapeutic aspects of legal proce-
dures; and 4) the therapeutic aspects of judicial and legal roles. He assumes
that the law seeks expressly to promote therapeutic objectives, such as a mean-
ingful right to treatment, but that the law often does not recognize the
antitherapeutic aspects of even that concept in practice. 23 It would seem that
this approach, which continues to be rejected by extremists in both the legal
Cty., Mich. 1973), a mentally disordered sex offender gave consent to experimental psychosur-
gery, in order to help him control his violent behavior. He had been told that he would never be
released from maximum security as long as his aggressive behavior continued, and he had not
responded to any other treatment. A libertarian attorney filed suit, without support from his "cli-
ent," to block the treatment. The trial court held that because the treatment was experimental,
irreversible, and affected the brain, no incarcerated person was capable of giving informed con-
senL
Although this decision has no technical precedential value, it has been cited by attorneys to
prevent willing patient/clients from accepting nonstandard treatment. For example, when the au-
thor developed a voluntary treatment procedure for committed sex offenders involving the use of
anti-androgen medication to reduce (but not eliminate) abnormally high sex drive, the attorney for
a state advocacy program objected, citing Kaimowitz to support her contention that no incarcerated
person could give consent to the experimental (and reversible) use of an FDA-approved medica-
tion. Letter from Dianne Greenley, Project Director, Advocacy for Institutionalized Persons, Wis-
consin Coalition for Advocacy, to Robert D. Miller (May 3, 1985) (on file with the author). Had
her objections been voiced in court, they might well have prevented patients from receiving the
only treatment that would permit them to gain sufficient control over their sexual arousal to be
released.
Another example of overreaction to past abuses involves research with institutionalized
populations. There is no question that such populations have been abused in the past---the
Tuskeegee syphilis experiments come to mind. But the current guidelines of the American Cor-
rectional Association, the standards for practices in prisons and jails, prohibit all medical research
with inmates, whether the treatment may be life-saving or not. "Written agency policy prohibits
inmates/juveniles/residents from participating in medical or pharmaceutical testing for experimen-
tal or research purposES." AMERiCAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOC., STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORREC-
TIONS/INSTITUTIONS, Std. 2-CO-IF-14 (Mar. 1, 1996).
121. See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE (1991); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
A New Approach to Psychology and the Law, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF
THE DISCIPLINE 211 (James R.P. Ogloff ed., 1992); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research,
45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991).
122. David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, in DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 8
(1991).
123. See, e.g., David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DAVID B.
WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 17 (1991). Attorneys can
tell patients the same things that their treaters tell them, but are heard differently. See generally
Robert D. Miller et al., Litigiousness as a Resistance to Therapy. 14 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 109
(1986). This approach requires treatment-oriented advocates who can see the whole picture and
who know something about mental disorder. Since few attorneys receive adequate experience with
mentally disordered persons in law school, and the legal literature is heavily biased against psychi-
atric treatment, I am not arguing here for co-option of attorneys, but for attorneys operating based
on accurate information rather than ideology.
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and mental health camps, represents the best hope for reconciliation, which
would remove the supposed clients of both from the current crossfire between
them.
E. Coercion in Correctional Facilities
This article has discussed the increased incidence of mentally disordered
persons in the criminal justice system. Rights-oriented advocates have not
complained vociferously about this situation, in part because the civil rights of
criminal defendants are scrupulously protected. Unfortunately, however, most
advocates lose interest once defendants are convicted and incarcerated." 4 Of
course, correctional systems are all about coercion; what concerns us here are
the additional problems that exist for inmates because they are mentally disor-
dered. For example, although correctional inmates are the only population in
this country that have a constitutional right to treatment,"2 including mental
health treatment,'26 inmates are also the only group of mentally disordered
persons officially and openly discriminated against( because of their status.
Courts have required correctional systems to develop effective screening'27
and tracking systems for their mentally disordered inmates' 2 and to provide
adequate treatment for those with serious mental illnesses. 9 But those in-
mates so identified are concomitantly disadvantaged by their very classifica-
tion.
In a national survey of all state correctional systems,'" forty-eight of
fifty-one responded that they use psychiatric diagnosis in placement decisions;
twenty of fifty-one states use maximum security placements for seriously
mentally ill inmates, regardless of their actual behavior. Some states bar seri-
ously mentally ill inmates from many, if not all, minimum security facilities.
Twenty-two of the thirty states that have them prohibit inmates with major
mental disorders, or those who are taking psychotropic medications, from
participating in boot camp programs, perhaps the most significant advantage a
124. Most of the legal advocacy programs concentrate their efforts in the civil system, and
correctional systems-especially prisons-have been more successful in fending off attempts to
place advocates or ombudspersons in their facilities. The chief exception is the National Prison
Project, affiliated with the American Civil Liberties Union, that directs all its efforts toward state
prison systems. Since it is a private organization, it is not subject to the cutbacks and restrictions
that have increasingly prevented federally-funded advocacy programs from filing class action suits,
and its efforts have led to major improvements in over half the nation's prison systems. It does
not restrict itself to mental health issues, but those issues are invariably litigated as part of class
action suits. See Robert D. Miller, Current Status of Prison Mental Health Litigation, 20 NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHtATRY L. 57 (1995).
125. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) ("[Dleliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
126. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977).
127. Jeffrey Metzner et al., Mental Health Screening and Evaluation Within Prisons, 22
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 451 (1994).
128. See, e.g., Austin v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 876 F. Supp. 1437, 1451, 1457,
1460 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
129. See Bowring, 551 F.2d at 47.
130. See generally Robert D. Miller & Jeffrey Metzner, Psychiatric Stigma in Correctional
Facilities, 22 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 621 (1994).
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corrections system can confer on an inmate. Many of these policies, to be
sure, are based on lack of mental health resources to monitor the effects of
medication at many facilities. Not discrimination per se, but the effect is the
same. At a time when the incidence of mentally disordered inmates is growing
rapidly,131 such discrimination is particularly problematic.
3
1
IV. EXTERNAL SOCIAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
A. Stigma
In addition to the legal coercion discussed above, mentally disordered
persons are increasingly exposed to more diffuse social pressures which are
more difficult to protect against. Despite a plethora of educational programs
aimed at the general public, the stigma associated with being mentally disor-
dered continues unabated. Since the effects of social coercion are often not
direct acts of the state, legal advocates tend to ignore them, except to list the
existence of stigma as a factor militating keeping mentally disordered persons
out of the mental health system altogether. But because of the stigma, mental-
ly disordered persons have difficulty obtaining the specialized housing that
they require,' and also have difficulty in obtaining employment. 34
131. See generally Henry J. Steadman & Stephen A. Ribner, Changing Perceptions of the
Mental Health Needs of Inmates in Local Jails, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1115 (1980). Approxi-
mately 670,000 mentally ill inmates are admitted to jails each year, or nearly eight times the num-
ber admitted to state mental hospitals. See CENTER ON CRIME, COMMUNrrIEs & CULTURE, RE-
SEARCH BRF. MENTAL ILLNESS IN U.S. JAILS: DIVERTING THE NONVIOLENT, Low-LEVEL OF-
FENDER (1996).
132. In Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), inmates challenged a California
prison's blanket policy of prohibiting HIV-positive inmates from working in food service. The
trial court held that the policy violated section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that while Iv-positive status was a disability under the ADA and,
therefore, the Rehabilitation Act, Id. at 1446, and the prison's acceptance of federal funds placed it
under the Act, Id., the Rehabilitation Act was not specifically designed to apply to prisons, and
inmates do not possess the same rights as noninmates. Ild. at 1446-47. It accepted the prison's
argument that because of the fact that many inmates believed (however falsely) that they would be
placed at risk by having to eat food prepared by HIV-positive inmates, the prison had a legitimate
security reason to deny food service jobs to HIV-positive inmates. Id. at 1447-48.
133. Since zoning laws are governmental actions, the courts have been willing to address their
alleged discrimination against the mentally disabled. The Supreme Court ruled in City of Edmonds
v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (1995), that Edmonds' zoning ordinance requiring occupants
of a single-family dwelling to be "persons related by genetics, adoption, or marriage, or a group of
five or fewer [untelated] persons," violated the 1988 Fair Housing Act (FHA), which prevents
housing discrimination based on disability. The Court held that since an unlimited number of
related people could live together under the ordinance, it was intended to discriminate against
unrelated people, and thus did not fall under the "maximum occupancy" exception to the FHA. Id.
at 1781-82.
Lower courts have subsequently denied housing permits for facilities for disabled persons,
however, when the ordinances in question were more carefully crafted to avoid the problems
found in City of Edmonds. A federal district court in Maryland, see Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v.
Howard Cry., Md., 911 F. Supp. 918, 931 (D. Md. 1996), and the Eighth Circuit, see Oxford
House v. St. Louis, 77 F.3d 249, 252 (8th Cir. 1996), both held that maximum occupancy ordi-
nances expressed legitimate governmental interests in regulating traffic and other problems.
134. This article does not discuss the burgeoning literature on the application of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act to mentally disordered persons in the workplace. It is interesting to
note, however, that at least two federal courts have held that questions concerning past mental
disorder on applications to take bar examinations may constitute impermissible discrimination. See
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Perhaps the most telling example of the stigma associated with being
mentally ill comes as the result of a 1966 Supreme Court case, Baxstrom v.
Herold.3 That decision led to the discharge or transfer of 989 patients hos-
pitalized in a New York maximum security correctional facility."3 Henry
Steadman and his colleagues followed the patients' progress for ten years. As
part of the study, researchers collected newspaper articles about the patients,
all of whom were both ex-mental patients ("mad") and ex-convicts ("bad"). in
every one of the hundreds of articles Steadman reviewed, the subject was de-
scribed as an ex-mental patient-never an ex-convict.
B. Economic Coercion
Economic factors have been inadequately studied as indirect but powerful
sources of coercion upon mentally disordered persons. When asylums were
first built in this country in the 1800s, a major argument in legislatures for
hospitalizing mentally disordered persons was that the facilities would be self-
sustaining and, in fact, many were in those early years. The larger institutions
grew their own food, made their own clothes, and generally operated as self-
contained communities, largely on (free) patient labor. This practice depended,
of course, on keeping the higher-functioning patients for long periods of time
(the seriously mentally ill patients in the back wards were of no economic
value, which was why many of them had been committed in the first
place).1
37
With the increased dumping of dysfunctional persons into asylums, the
basic costs of running the institutions increased to the point that they became
economic liabilities to the administrating governments. During the civil rights
revolution of the 1960s and '70s, unpaid patient labor was attacked as "insti-
tutional peonage," and states were forced to pay minimum wages to patients
for their work."3 When the lack of resources and even minimally adequate
treatment programs was litigated, federal courts mandated significant im-
Clark v. Virginia Bd. of Bar Examiners, 880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va., 1995); Ellen S. v. Florida
Bd. of Bar Examiners, 859 F. Supp. 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1994). In response, the American Bar Associ-
ation approved a compromise resolution that rejected existing practices of detailed inquiry into an
applicant's past mental health history, but permitted inquiry into an applicant's current function-
ing. Similar suits have been filed against medical licensing boards, and the American Medical
Association has recommended that inquiries be permitted only as to disabilities that require reports
concerning competence to be made to the board, or that may reasonably be expected to affect a
physician's current practice. See Robert D. Miller, Licensing and Mental Disability, 20 NEWSL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCFATRY L. 21 (1995). It also stressed the importance of confidentiality in these
matters. See id.
135. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
136. See generally HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. CocozzA, CAREERS OF THE CRIMINAL-
LY INSANE (1974).
137. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE AsYLUM AND ITS ALTER-
NATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 346-50 (1980).
138. As an unfortunate result of this appropriate determination, patients were subsequently
denied the opportunity to perform truly therapeutic work, because state departments of mental
health would not provide the necessary funds in their budgets. See ANDREw T. SCULL,
DECARCERATION: COMMUNrrY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT-A RADICAL VIEw 139 (2d ed.
1984). Scull also argues that another purpose of the civil rights litigation was to force discharges
from hospitals by making it economically infeasible to hold patients. Id.
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provements in staffing and other resources,39 thus further increasing the
costs of operating state mental hospitals.
States responded by supporting advocates' efforts to limit admissions to
state hospitals, and to "deinstitutionalize" those patients who were already
there. 4" The original plan had been to take money saved from down-sizing
state hospitals and transfer it to community-based treatment facilities-the
"money follows the patient" plan. 4 For many reasons, this plan never
worked in practice. The major reason was that while the census in state facili-
ties has dropped by over eighty-five percent over the past forty years, im-
provements in court-mandated conditions and staffing have increased the cost
per patient to the extent that relatively little actual savings have occurred. In
addition, civil rights advocates filed suits to block needed improvements in
hospitals, fearing states would merely divert funds so utilized from essential
programs for community-based treatment. 42 In addition, the due process
protections mandated by the courts took much needed funds from clinical
resources. 1
43
Another initial economic incentive for deinstitutionalization was the influx
of federal money into community mental health centers beginning in the
1960s, giving state governments the opportunity to cost-shift by transferring
patients to those facilities. Some states passed laws requiring local govern-
ments to reimburse the state for their*residents who were hospitalized in state
facilities.'" When the federal monies that had supported treatment of the
chronically mentally ill dried up, however, local governments felt the financial
pinch, and their community mental health centers had to look to paying or
insured clients to continue operating."
One beneficiary of the deinstitutionalization movement was the nursing
139. The leading case is Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). For a discus-
sion of subsequent cases, see Stephen Rachlin, Litigating a Right to Treatment: Woe is Me, 58
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 182 (198).
140. See Lawrence H. Schwartz, Litigating the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 32
HOSe. CoMm. PSYCHIATRY 460, 462 (1981).
141. Id.
142. From 1964 until 1980, costs per patient per day at Bryce State Hospital rose from $3.50
to $65. See Conference Report, Wyatt v. Stickney: Retrospect and Prospect, 32 Hosp. COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 123, 125 (1981) [hereinafter Conference Report]. Morton Birnbaum, the creator of
the concept of a right to treatment, see Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J.
499 (1960), continued to pursue his creation in the courts for nearly 30 more years. His litigation
through the state and federal courts, primarily Woe v. Cuomo, 801 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1986), ulti-
mately resulted in the accreditation by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations of all New York's state mental hospitals, at a tremendous cost to the state. See
Stephen Rachlin, Litigating a Right to Treatment: Woe Is Me, 60 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 182 (1988).
143. Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil, Aftermath of the Rogers Decision: Assessing the
Costs, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348, 1351 (1990) (reporting that the budget of the Massachusetts
Department of Mental Health increased by over a million dollars during an 18-month period fol-
lowing Rogers). The cost of compliance includes, of course, the costs to the judiciary and others
in the judicial system, as well as the thousands of hours of clinical time taken away from patients
in order to prepare and testify in involuntary treatment hearings.
144. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 51.42(3)(as) (1976); see also Robert D. Miller, Economic Factors
Leading to the Diversion of the Mentally Disordered from the Civil to the Criminal Commitment
Systems, 15 INT'L J.L. & PsYcHIATRY 1 (1992).
145. See generally FRANKLIN CHU & SHARLAND TROTTER, THE MADNESS ESTABISHMENT:
RALPH NADEt's STUDY GROUP REPORT ON THE NATIONAL IIsTrrm oF PUBLIc HEALTH (1974).
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home industry. A large number of mental patients that had been hospitalized
for years were "transinstitutionalized"' to these facilities, which were sup-
ported in part by federal money. Because these were not state facilities, many
civil rights activists were not concerned, despite the fact that many chronically
mentally ill patients had been better off in hospitals which had programs spe-
cifically designed for their needs-programs almost totally lacking in nursing
homes. Once the federal government caught on to what was happening, it
threatened to cut off all funding to nursing homes with above a certain per-
centage of chronically mentally ill residents, because its support of medically
ill home inhabitants did not include those with mental illnesses.47 As a re-
sult of patients being thrown out of hospitals and then out of nursing homes,
patients who would have been hospitalized in the past had nowhere to live.
Again, since this is not the direct result of state action, patients' constitutional
rights were not violated, and their injuries are difficult to articulate in tort
litigation."u
This latter discrimination against mentally disordered persons is not the
sole province of the federal government, however. Most private insurance
companies, and now managed care corporations, have always refused to pro-
vide equal coverage for persons with mental disorders, as compared with
146. See generally H. Richard Lamb & Roger Peele, The Need for Continuing Asylum and
Sanctuary, 35 HosP. & COMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 798 (1984); Leonard J. Schmidt et al., The
Mentally Ill in Nursing Homes: New Back Wards in the Community, 34 ARCHIVEs GEN. PSYCH-
ATRY 687 (1977); William R. Shadish & Richard R. Bootzin, Nursing Homes and Chronic Mental
Patients, 7 SCHIZOPHRENIA. BULL. 488 (1981); Darold A. Treffert, Sane Asylum: An Alternative to
the Mental Hospital, 17 CURRENrT PsycnAmIc THERAPY 309 (1977).
147. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 105 S. Ct. 2210 (1985).
148. The majority of legal efforts to require the provision of community mental health servic-
es have resulted in consent decrees. See Michael S. Lottman, Enforcement of Judicial Decrees:
Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 MENTAL DISABILrY L. REP. 69 (1976). Courts have been reluctant
to create a right to treatment for voluntary patients in the community, and many of the decisions
have been based on state laws that guarantee such services or guarantee services in the least re-
strictive environment. Id. Enforcing such orders has proved problematic in many instances, and
courts have had to continue their monitoring for years in some cases (e.g., Wyatt is still under
court supervision after 26 years). Id.
For a discussion of specific consent decrees, see Barbara Armstrong, St. Elizabeths Hospi-
tal: Case Study of a Court Order, 30 Hosp. & CoMMuNrrY PSYCHIATRY 42 (1979); Jeffrey L.
Geller et al., Second-Generation Deinstitutionalization, 11: The Impact of Brewster v. Dukakis on
Correlates of Community and Hospital Utilization, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 988 (1990); and
Stonewall B. Stickney, Problems Implementing the Right to Treatment in Alabama: The Wyatt v.
Stickney Case, 25 HosP. & COMMUNrrY PsYCHIATRY 452 (1974).
One frequent consequence of court decisions based on statutory rights to treatment is a
legislative attempt to thwart the decision (or preempt future ones) by removing the rights. When
the Colorado Supreme Court held, in Goebel v. Colorado Dept. of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785
(Colo. 1988), that the state Act for the Care and Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 11 CoLO. REv.
STAT. §§ 27-10-101 to 129 (1982 & Supp. 1988) created a statutory right to appropriate treatment
in the community for patients who had been voluntarily or involuntarily hospitalized, the state
legislature amended the Care & Treatment Act by inserting "subject to available appropriations" in
sections 27-10-101, -108, -109, and -116, and 27-10.5-101, -103, -105, -106 and -206. The legisla-
ture subsequently introduced further legislation (Senate Bill 94-221) that would have made it
explicit that voluntary patients have no right to mental health services. That bill was defeated,
largely through organized opposition by advocacy groups (including the Colorado Alliance for the
Mentally Ill Forensic Network Taskforce, the Colorado Mental Health Association, and the Colo-
rado Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Program), but has continued to
be introduced in subsequent legislative sessions.
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"medical" illnesses. 49 "Parity" in insurance coverage has become a major
political agenda for the American Psychiatric and American Psychological
Associations. ' While the self-serving nature of such agendas is apparent,
the ultimate effect is on the mentally disordered persons, many of whom are
no longer provided with treatment from any source. Parity legislation has
passed the U.S. Congress, and is currently before a number of state legisla-
tures.'5  Other similar forms of discrimination include the recent exclusion of
persons convicted of drug-related felonies from social security payments,'52
and the exclusion of alcoholics from Veterans' Administration educational
benefits.'53 The public mental health system, including state hospitals and
local community mental health centers, used to provide the safety net for those
with serious mental illnesses, most of whom can not obtain private insurance.
Now that capitation plans are sweeping the country, that net is becoming as
riddled with holes as is the private system.
An attempt in Wisconsin to use economic pressure to force change in the
delivery of mental health services backfired badly; as part of the reforms in
civil commitment following the Lessard decision, the state legislature made
counties financially liable for the costs of hospitalizing their severely mentally
disordered citizens in state facilities. This legislation did have the desired
effect of forcing counties to develop their own local inpatient facilities, but as
the legislation did not affect the state's responsibility for forensic patients
(those being evaluated for competency to proceed and those found either in-
competent or insane), the result was an increase in the numbers of patients
admitted through the criminal justice system, the majority of whom were
charged with misdemeanors. 54
149. See Two Presidents Agree to Work Together for Parity, 31(18) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1
(1996).
150. See Capitol Hill Continues to Hear About Need for Parity, 31(21) PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1
(1996).
151. The Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-204, tit. VII, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) provides parity for yearly and lifetime caps
between mental disorders and other medical disorders. The Colorado House debated House Bill
1192 during the 1997 Legislative Session, which would provide complete parity for specified
mental disorders--schizophrenias, affective disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and post
traumatic stress disorder.
152. Pub. L. 104-12, § 105(a), 110 Stat. 851, 852 (enacted Mar. 29, 1996), denies SSI and
SSDI benefits to anyone disabled by substance abuse if convicted of a substance abuse related
felony.
153. In Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Veteran's
Administration's irrebuttable presumption that all primary alcoholism is attributable to willful
misconduct did not violate section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 551. The Court did not
find it necessary to decide whether alcoholism is a disease. Id. at 552.
154. See generally Miller, supra note 144; see also Walter Dickey, Incompetency and the
Non-dangerous Mentally Ill Client, 16 CRIM. L. BuLL. 22 (1980); Stephen Rachlin, Incompetent
Misdemeanants-Pseudocivil Commitment, 14 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 23 (1986);
Darold A. Treffert, Legal "Rites": Criminalizing the Mentally Ill, 3 HILLSIDE J. CLINICAL PSY-
CHIATRY 123 (1979).
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V. INTERNAL CLINICAL COERCION ON PATIENTS
A. Capacity to Give Informed Consent and Denial of Illness
Many civil rights activists behave as if mental disorders don't exist. De-
riving sustenance from the voluminous (and repetitive) works of Thomas
Szasz, which denied the very existence of mental disorder,'" and the more
sophisticated writings of Stephen Morse's' and Ennis and Litwack,' who
did not deny the existence of mental disorder, but argued that psychiatrists
could not adequately diagnose or treat it. These advocates rejected clinicians'
arguments that mentally disordered persons could not make competent deci-
sions about their treatment because of their disorders, and also rejected the
possibility that mentally disordered persons' expressed wishes might be due to
their disorders and thus not represent their true feelings. Clinicians, who fol-
low their patients over long periods of time rather than at specific points along
a time line, recognize that serious mental disorders significantly affect
patients' abilities to understand and accept that they are ill and, thus, that they
need treatment.'
5
The right to refuse psychiatric treatment-which is more accurately char-
acterized as the patient's right to make treatment decisions to either accept or
refuse proposed treatment-has often centered around the legal concept of
informed consent. For such consent to be accepted, the clinician must provide
adequate information upon which a patient can base a decision: the patient
must have the capacity to make a decision; and the decision must be free from
external coercion.
Mental health and legal professionals have often differed in their interpre-
tations of the capacity issue. Loren Roth' and Laurence Tancredi'" have
discussed the spectrum of levels of capacity displayed by patients in informed
consent paradigms, displayed in Table Two.
155. See generally THOMAS S. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); THoMAs S. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS: FOUNDATIONS OF A THEORY OF PERSONAL CoNDuCT (1961).
156. See Morse, supra note 2. Morse argues that mentally disordered persons are no more
incompetent than other groups that exhibit poor judgment, such as smokers and overeaters; and
that nonmentally ill persons with poor judgment are as treatable as those with mental illnesses. Id.
at 61. He simply asserts these propositions without the evidence that he expects mental health
professionals to provide for their arguments; and he ignores the powerful effects of some mental
disorders on reality testing and cognitive functioning. While treatment (such as smoking cessation
clinics, diet programs and Alcoholics Anonymous) do have beneficial effects for some addicted
persons, their success rates do not begin to compare with the effects of medication on psychotic or
severely depressed patients. A good comparison can be made with the behavioral treatment of
volitional obesity versus the biological treatment of obesity secondary to metabolic disease.
157. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 65.
158. See, e.g., Loren H. Roth et al., The Dilemma of Denial in the Assessment of Competency
to Refiuse Treatment, 138 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 910 (1982).
159. See generally Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); see also Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doc-
trine of Informed Consent, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 285 (1977).
160. Laurence R. Tancredi, Competency for Informed Consent: Conceptual Limits of Empir-




LEVELS OF INFORMED CONSENT
1. The Capacity to Evidence a Choice
2. The Capacity to Base a Choice on "Rational" Reasons
3. The Capacity to Understand Information Relevant to the Choice
4. The Capacity to Apply that Understanding to One's Own Situation
For many advocates, Level One is sufficient---that is, they accept their clients'
stated wishes without further inquiry as to the bases of those decisions, since
advocates do not acknowledge the internal conflicts experienced by seriously
mentally disordered persons. Clinicians, on the other hand, look to the reasons
for the decisions. Patients who are capable of accurately reciting the objective
risks and benefits of a proposed treatment are still not considered competent
either to refuse or to accept the treatment unless they accept that they are
suffering from the disorder for which the treatment is proposed. Cognitive
knowledge alone, or a "factual" understanding in the Dusky model, is insuffi-
cient to serve as a basis for meaningful informed consent.
This approach assumes great significance because the clinical research
literature demonstrates that denial of illness is the most common reason for
refusal of clinically appropriate treatment by psychiatric patients. 6' Thus,
serious mental disorders-which are the ones for which psychiatric medica-
tions are prescribed-rob patients not only of their abilities to function au-
tonomously, but also of their capacities to make truly informed choices about
treatments that would restore their capacities and autonomy.
Alan Wertheimer distinguishes between negative freedom (absence of
external constraints) and positive freedom (in which one can act autonomous-
ly). 6' He agrees that mental disorders can rob patients of positive freedom.
The consequentialist position would be that if coerced treatment is the best
objective alternative, it should be employed regardless of the patient's wishes.
The rights position is that patients cannot be coerced for their own good.
Wertheimer suggests that advocates often base this position on their own dis-
trust of the therapeutic establishment, rather than on their clients' wishes. He
cautions that paternalism can be justified only if patients are not capable of
autonomous or voluntary action. Wertheimer further argues that Stone's "thank
you theory"'63 does not replace initial consent, but does suggest the reason-
ableness of the coercive action taken. In addition, while it may be, and certain-
ly has been, argued that society can coerce a person only to protect others,'6
161. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
162. Alan Wertheimer, A Philosophical Examination of Coercion for Mental Health Issues, I I
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 239 (1993).
163. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
164. This argument is a central tenet of libertarian philosophy, most eloquently expressed by
John Stuart Mill: "The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant" JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 9 (1978). Those
citing Mill, however, generally ignore the subsequent statement that "[ilt is, perhaps, hardly neces-
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it could also be argued that a person who is temporarily irrational may be pre-
vented from harming his "normal self," and thus can be coerced under the
danger-to-others rationale.
B. Judicial Concepts of Voluntariness and Consent
Although the courts have not provided comprehensive discussions of the
capacity prong of the test for informed consent, they have discussed
voluntariness at some length, albeit not in the context of informed consent.'"
Most of the decisions have come from criminal cases, particularly in the con-
text of capacity to waive constitutional rights.'" Before the current ascendan-
cy of conservatives on the Supreme Court, the Court defined voluntariness in
subjective terms, i.e., what defendants themselves experienced in the situation,
with their own unique capacities. 67 Former Chief Justice Burger recognized
in 1979 that "[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in
need of treatment is neither wholly at liberty or free of stigma."'"
More recently, however, the Court has rejected its own precedents and
allowed police to use deceit to obtain confessions." More significant, it has
changed from a subjective to an objective test of voluntariness, at least in the
criminal system. In its recent decision in Colorado v. Connelly, 7° the majori-
ty not only defined voluntariness to mean solely the lack of intentional police
misconduct, but rejected the entire concept of free will, at least in the context
of police interrogations.' 7' This result suggests that the legal system is sim-
ply unprepared or unwilling to tackle the problem of voluntariness as applied
to mentally disordered persons. By focusing on the conduct of others, the
individual's autonomy may simply be ignored.
VI. EXTERNAL COERCION OF CLINICIANS
Discussions of coercion rarely concern themselves with service providers.
It is assumed that providers have chosen their professions and can, therefore,
leave their jobs if the conditions become unpleasant. This view was unfortu-
nately reinforced by the president of the American Psychiatric Association in
1958, when he called for psychiatrists to abandon the state hospital system
because of its (admitted) deficiencies."
sary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their facul-
ties." Id.
165. See generally Robert D. Miller, The U.S. Supreme Court Looks at Voluntariness and
Consent, 17 INT'L J.L. & PSYcinATRY 239 (1994).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
169. In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the Court upheld a confession obtained
through police deception, stating that "Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception." Id.
at 297.
170. 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
171. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169. In ruling admissible a confession obtained from an obviously
psychotic person who said that he confessed under the commands of auditory hallucinations, the
court concluded that "notions of 'free will' have no place [in this area of constitutional law]." Id.
172. Harry Solomon, Presidential Address to the American Psychiatric Association, 115 AM.
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It is true that good clinicians can always elect to leave bad facilities or
systems. Many, however, choose to remain in the public systems that provide
mental health services to the most severely disordered patients, and continue to
treat the majority of involuntarily committed patients. The focus here is not
the coercion that they experience themselves, but rather the effects of that
coercion on the patients they treat.
A. Legal Constraints on Clinicians
1. Negligent Release and the Duty to Protect Third Parties
In the past several decades, the law has characterized clinicians as under-
cover law enforcement officials. As mental health professionals adapted to
changes in involuntary civil commitment laws and began to offer the required
predictions of dangerousness in court in order to be able to provide their ser-
vices to severely mentally disordered persons, the law has taken them at their
word, and held them responsible for such predictions in other areas. Mental
health professionals practicing in inpatient settings have for years been held
responsible for not discharging involuntary patients considered to still be dan-
gerous, and for petitioning for commitment of voluntary patients they consider
dangerous but who request discharge. The fact that they had assumed legal
custody of those patients placed upon them a concomitant burden to maintain
custody until the patients were no longer felt to be dangerous. "'
What is new is the law holding psychotherapists increasingly responsible
for controlling or reporting outpatients' behavior. The ground-breaking case
was Tarasoff,74 in which the California Supreme Court held that the special
relationship exception in the Second Restatement of Torts applied to the psy-
chotherapist-patient relationship, and that when patients make threats of vio-
lence to identifiable victims, therapists have an obligation to protect those
victims. 75 Most other states have reached similar conclusions, although not
always on the same legal rationale." 6 Many clinicians predicted the death of
psychotherapy as we know it," but the research data, indirect though they
are, have not supported those predictions." One result that has been demon-
strated anecdotally but not, to date, through methodologically sound research,
is that clinicians feel compelled to initiate involuntary commitment and to
delay release of patients who they likely would have released before Tarasoff
and its progeny.
J. PsYCHIATRY 1 (1958).
173. See, e.g., Robert D. Miller et a]., Emerging Problems for Staff Associated with the Re-
lease of Potentially Dangerous Forensic Patients, 16 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 309
(1988).
174. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) (Tarasoff 11).
175. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431.
176. See generally ALAN R. FELTHOUs, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN OR PRO-
TECT (1989); CONFIDENTIAtrrY VERSUS THE DUTY TO PROTECT: FORESEEABLE HARM IN THE
PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY (James Beck ed., 1990).
177. ALAN STONE, The Tarasoff Case and Some of Its Progeny: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALrrY (1984).
178. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private
Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 497 (1984).
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2. Requirements to Report Child, Domestic, and Therapist Abuse
Two types of reporting laws designed for primary care physicians rather
than psychotherapists have also led to some concern. The earlier and more
common type is the child abuse reporting laws. While versions in the fifty-one
jurisdictions vary, most require a variety of professionals to report if they have
"reason to believe" that child physical or sexual abuse has occurred.'" More
recently, several states have added a requirement to rotsexual abuse b,
previous psychotherapists," ° and domestic abuse as well.'
The child abuse reporting laws are relatively noncontroversial, as they
apply to clinicians such as pediatricians and emergency physicians who see the
victims. The problems arise when therapists treat the perpetrators, or treat
adults who were abused as children. Few child abuse reporting laws have
statutes of limitations, so the laws may mandate reporting even when the
perpetrator is dead.
Instead of serving society by treating abusers, these laws force clinicians
to betray their patients by making reports to the police, and in most states
subsequently testifying against their patients in criminal court." 2 Some treat-
ing therapists even feel compelled to give Miranda-type warnings to patients
at the onset of therapy, warning them about all the situations in which con-
fidentiality must be breached. Such warnings hardly provide the environment
179. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304(1) (Supp. 1990):
Any person specified in subsection (2) who has reasonable cause to know or suspect that
a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect or who has observed the child being
subjected to circumstances or conditions which would reasonably result in abuse or
neglect shall immediately report... such fact to the county department or local law
enforcement agency.
Subsection (2) includes physicians, nurses, and mental health professionals. Id. §§ 19-3-304(2)(a),
(i), (n). Several authors argue that mandated reporting of child abuse may give therapists leverage
with resistant patients, at the cost of upsetting the balance even more away from patients and
toward therapists. See Elizabeth Anderson et al., Coercive Uses of Mandatory Reporting in
Therapeutic Relationships, 11 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 335 (1993). Anderson and her co-authors inter-
viewed 30 therapists who had made child abuse reports concerning children or families already in
treatment with them during the previous 12 months. They found that therapists had mixed feelings
about the mandate to report many therapists resented the forced role of policeman, were con-
cerned about their legal liability, and/or blamed the patient for the predicament; other therapists
welcomed the authority under the law to effect changes in dysfunctional family systems. Id. at
342-44.
180. California requires only that psychotherapists who become aware that a patient has sexu-
al contact with a previous therapist provide the patient with a brochure prepared by the state
which describes, among many other things, administrative, civil, and other complaint procedures
and remedies. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 337, 728 (1990). Wisconsin requires that a therapist
who has reason to believe that a current client had sexual contact on or after May 16, 1996, with
a previous therapist, ask the client if he or she wants the contact reported. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
940.22(3)(a) (West 1996). Reports cannot be made without client consent, and clients can decide
whether to have their identities revealed in the report. Id. Immunity from liability for good faith
reporting is provided. Id. at § 940.22(5). Failure to follow the statute's requirements is a Class A
misdemeanor. Id. at § 940.22(3)(d).
181. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-36-135(1) (West 1996) (requiring reporting of domes-
tic abuse as well as gunshot wounds and other injuries or illnesses that appear to result from crim-
inal behavior).
182. See generally Robert D. Miller & Robert Weinstock, Conflict of Interest Between Ther-




of safety and trust so essential to successful psychotherapy.
In cases in which therapists are treating adult victims of child or domestic
abuse, mandatory reporting can force patients to deal with their histories of
abuse publicly before they have been able to resolve their feelings in therapy.
The same is true in those states that require therapists to make reports when
patients tell them of abuse by previous therapists." 3
3. Antitrust Litigation
Courts had traditionally stayed out of the regulation of intraprofessional
disputes, basing their position on the "learned professions" exception.84
More recently, however, courts have decided that since medical facilities re-
ceive equipment and supplies through interstate commerce, the federal courts
have jurisdiction under antitrust law.'85 This change of policy has been used
by clinicians, including psychiatrists and psychologists, to overturn disciplinary
actions by hospital credentials and peer review committees, as well as by li-
censing boards. Sanctioned clinicians, particularly those who lost privileges or
licenses, have argued successfully, and sometimes unfortunately, that their
disciplinary actions had economic bases, to reduce competition with estab-
lished clinicians in the field. This use of antitrust litigation for covert purposes
subverts those legitimate efforts to improve the quality of clinical practice, and
the public has been justifiably concerned that internal regulatory agencies in
all professions do not adequately police their professions. Even where litiga-
tion does not overturn a disciplinary action, regulatory boards-especially
hospital-based boards, whose member clinicians are understandably reluctant
to spend their time in court rather than treating patients-are increasingly
intimidated and less willing to implement their professional judgment.
Another type of institutional coercion of both clinicians and their patients
involves competency to be executed. The Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eighth Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment to proscribe execu-
tion of the incompetent."' This raised the issue of which methods states
could use to restore a death row inmate's competency so that the state could
execute him. Clinicians who evaluate death row inmates for competency for
execution, particularly those required to treat incompetent inmates, are placed
in an ethical dilemma,' although one can argue that for physicians to refuse
183. See generally Larry Strasburger et al., Mandatory Reporting of Sexually Exploitative
Psychotherapists, 18 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PsYcHIATRY & L. 379 (1990).
184. Arizona v. Maricopa Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982) (explaining that chal-
lenged conduct of professionals is subject to "the rule of reason" versus a per se analysis under
the Sherman Act where acts are "premised on public service or ethical norms"); Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975) (finding that while the professions were not immune
from prosecution under the Sherman Act, the "public service aspect" versus "a pure business
aspect" of a profession justified treating acts which technically violate the law "differently').
185. Robert D. Miller, Recent Developments in Antitrust: Challenges to Medical Autonomy, in
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF HosprrAL PoLiciEs AND PRACIcEs 70-71 (Robert D. Miller ed., 1989).
186. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
187. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet & George W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent
for Execution: Ethical Chaos with Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD. PsYCHIATRY & L.
297 (1988); see also Robert D. Miller, Evaluation of and Treatment to Competency to Be Execut-
ed: A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 67 (1988).
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to evaluate inmates who may be incompetent for execution denies the inmates
the chance to be found incompetent and avoid execution.", Professor Barba-
ra Ward argues that treating incompetent death row inmates perpetuates their
suffering, denies those who would prefer execution that right, and denies those
few who might have the ability to make substantial contributions to postcon-
viction procedures. 89
One osition statement, co-authored by physician and antideath penalty
groups, refers to involvement in the physical aspects of execution (inserting
intravenous lines, pronouncing death, etc.), but there is a section on psychiatric
participation that holds evaluation of competence for execution to be unethical
and treatment to restore competence for execution unethical except for cases
of "extreme suffering or immediate danger to life. '' "m The International
Academy of Law and Mental Health, the world's largest interdisciplinary
mental health organization, adopted the position as its own in June of
1994. 9
Some courts and legislatures have dealt substantively with the issue of
competence for execution. In Perry v. Louisiana," the Supreme Court re-
manded the case of an incompetent inmate who the state wanted to forcibly
medicate back to the Louisiana Supreme Court to consider the case in light of
Harper.93 The Louisiana court subsequently held that the state may not in-
voluntarily medicate a prisoner to render him competent for execution.'94
The court found that such practices constituted cruel and unusual punishment
under Louisiana's constitution, and violated an inmate's right to privacy.' 9
The court stated that "forcing a prisoner to take antipsychotic drugs to facili-
tate his execution does not constitute medical treatment but is antithetical to
the basic principles of the healing arts."'" Citing the Hippocratic Oath, the
court argued that forcing a physician to medicate an incompetent death row
inmate forces him to act unethically and contrary to the goals of medical treat-
ment."'
The South Carolina Supreme Court has also held that forced medication
violates inmates' privacy rights,'98 and in addition two state legislatures have
also addressed the issue. The Maryland legislature stated:
If the court finds [an] inmate to be incompetent [to be executed] it
shall stay any warrant of execution.., and remand the case to the
court in which the sentence of death was imposed, which shall strike
188. See generally Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psy-
chiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35 (1986).
189. Id.
190. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ET AL., BREACH OF TRusr. PHYSICIAN PARTICIPA-
TION IN EXECUTONS IN THE UNITED STATES 31, 33 (1994) (emphasis in original).
191. Personal Communication with Gregg Bloche (July 15, 1994).
192. 498 U.S. 38 (1990).
193. Perry, 498 U.S. at 38.
194. Perry v. Louisiana, 610 So. 2d 746, 758 (La. 1992).
195. Id. at 761.
196. Id. at 751.
197. Id. at 752.
198. Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 2d 75, 87-90 (1993).
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the sentence of death and enter in its place a sentence of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole.'"
Montana law does not provide for automatic commutation of a death sentence
upon a finding of incompetence for execution, but does state that "[i]f... the
court is of the view that so much time has elapsed since the commitment of
the defendant that it would be unjust to proceed with execution of the sen-
tence, the court may suspend the execution of the sentence and may order the
defendant to be discharged."'
Regardless of a particular state's approach to execution of incompetent
inmates, however, the process is fundamentally a powerful example of clini-
cians being coerced to be agents of the state, with their "patients" again the
ultimate sufferers.
B. Involuntary Civil Commitment
While it is apparent that involuntary civil commitment coerces the patient,
it is less often recognized that it also coerces therapists. That can serve a
positive purpose-patients who have fears of abandonment report that they are
reassured when they are committed to treatment by a particular therapist.2"
But it can also place additional burdens on outpatient therapists, particularly in
the post-Tarasoff era. Courts are more likely to hold outpatient therapists
responsible for patients that are committed to their care than to purely volun-
tary patients.' For this, as well as ideological reasons, a significant number
of outpatient therapists do not accept committed outpatients, with the usual
result being an involuntary hospitalization that could in most cases have been
avoided if the therapist had accepted the challenge in spite of the increased
risk of liability. °3
C. Economic Coercion
This article considered direct economic coercion on patients above;'
but pressures that affect patients are increasingly applied to their treaters. As
state mental hospitals became economic liabilities, and as the private psychiat-
ric hospitals and psychiatric units in general hospitals rejected indigent pa-
tients, public hospitals assumed the character and function of warehouses.
Clinicians were still responsible for providing adequate treatment with dwin-
dling resources, and assumed the liability when it was not provided.'
199. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27 § 75A(d)(3) (1996).
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-202(3) (1995).
201. See generally Katherine Schneider-Braus, Civil Commitment to Outpatient Psychothera-
py: A Case Study, 14 BuLL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 273 (1986).
202. See, e.g., Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or. 706 (1986).
203. See Robert D. Miller & Paul B. Fiddleman, Outpatient Commitment: Treatment in the
Least Restrictive Environment, 45 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 147 (1984).
204. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
205. See generally Robert Gibson, The Rights of Staff in the Treatment of the Mentally Il, 27
HosP. & COMMUNrrY PsycinATRY 855 (1976); Stephen Rachlin, One Right Too Many, 3 BULL.
Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 99 (1975).
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Just when the right to treatment suits appeared to have effected significant
improvements in public hospitals, however, states found ways to create new
classes of "patients" without providing the resources to provide even minimal
treatment. One example comes from Wisconsin, previously hailed for its atten-
tion to patient rights and its willingness to provide sufficient resources to
ensure adequate treatment. Recognizing that some insanity acquittees were in
effect political prisoners, and others were refusing to participate in any treat-
ment, the state mental health authority proposed legislation that would classify
acquittees as either "patients" or "detainees." "Patients" would be provided
with the full range of appropriate treatment, while "detainees" would be ware-
housed. The clinicians at the forensic facility initially supported the concept,
as the plan allowed them to concentrate their resources on treatable patients.
But when staff learned that the mental health authority, without consultation
with the staff responsible for treatment, had classified seventy-five percent of
the 200 acquittees as "detainees" (the staff put the number at twenty-five
percent) in order to cut costs, the staff openly opposed the proposed classifica-
tion. They were able to convince advocacy groups (which had also initially
supported the proposal) to oppose the legislation, and it was defeated.
More troubling is the fact that the legislatures that have created the new
sexual predator laws have not attempted to provide adequate funding for
meaningful treatment. 6 These programs place clinicians in the conundrum
of having to provide treatment to a population which engenders, arguably, the
most public and political concern, without providing the resources necessary to
effect any changes-a virtual guarantee that treatment will fail. Predictions
that sex offenders are inevitable treatment failures become self-fulfilling
prophecy, seemingly justifying indefinite commitments.
An allied offensive against sex offenders that attempts to legitimize its
punitive intent by involving psychiatrists is forced "chemical castration" of
child molesters. California Assembly Bill No. 3339, signed by Governor Wil-
son on September 17, 1996, authorizes judges to require convicted child mo-
lesters to take medroxyprogesterone acetate (Depo-Provera),' a medication
that reduces the level of testosterone, the male hormone, in a dose-dependent
fashion. The FDA has not approved the medication for use with male sex
offenders. The California law requires no medical evaluation to determine if
the medication is safe to administer, or clinically indicated. Depo-Provera has
been shown to be effective with perhaps ten percent of sex offenders-those
with abnormally high sexual arousal or sexual fantasy levels.'
206. Washington State opened its unit with virtually no staff. See Young v. Weston, 898 F.
Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995). One of the reasons that the Kansas Supreme Court rejected its
state's law, see Matter of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996), was because when the first "pa-
tient" was committed, there was no program at all in place. See American Psychiatric Ass'n, Posi-
tion Statement on the Adequacy of Treatment, 123 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1468 (1967). Proposed
legislation in Colorado also has woefully inadequate funding.
207. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The law mandates treatment for
parolees convicted of a second offense involving a child under 13. Id. § 645(b).
208. See, e.g., David Barry & J. Richard Ciccone, Use of Depo-Provera in the Treatment of
Aggressive Sexual Offenders: Preliminary Report of Three Cases, 3 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIA-
TRY & L. 179 (1975); John M.W. Bradford, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual Offenders, I1
1206 [Vol. 74:4
COERCION: CLINICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Colorado legislature is currently debating a bill based on the Califor-
nia law. It adds a number of medications as possible alternatives to Depo-
Provera, none of which are FDA-approved for male sex offenders, most of
which have not been shown to have any efficacy with such patients, and one
of which is not even legal to prescribe in the United States. Like the Califor-
nia law, it requires judges to sentence child molesters to treatment without




In similar circumstances, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v.
Gauntlet 21 0 overturned a judge's sentence of forced Depo-Provera treatment
as a condition of probation, finding the condition punitive, unlawful, and coer-
cive, " as well as virtually impossible to perform with informed "con-
sent." ' Further, the court held that "Depo-Provera treatment fails as a law-
ful condition of probation because it has not gained acceptance in the medical
community as a safe and reliable medical procedure. 2 3 Apparently this
court's reasoning did not impress California or Colorado legislators.
Luckily, few mental health professionals will fall into the legal quagmire
of determining "competence" to "consent" to Depo-Provera treatment. Many
more, however, will face issues of providing adequate care in the world of
managed care. Parity for insurance coverage was discussed above,2"4 but here
I am concerned with the pressures that many managed care corporations place
on employee/clinicians and the concomitant inferior care received by the sup-
posed clients of the corporation. Managed care, in its single-minded attention
to the bottom line, has "deprofessionalized" mental health care to an unprece-
dented degree. Front line mental health services are typically provided by
therapists with bachelor's or at best master's degrees, with access to psychia-
trists (who remain the only practitioners capable of diagnosing biological
mental disorders and providing medications and other physical treatments that
such patients require) severely limited by financial penalties for "excess" refer-
rals.
215
Edward Hanin and Harold Schwartz cite data on medication reimburse-
BULL. Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 159 (1983); John Money, Use of an Androgen-depleting
Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offenders, 6 J. SEx RES. 165 (1970). These articles are
representative of the literature which fails to condone using anti-androgen medication for "chemi-
cal castration." Note that a California parolee can avoid Depo-Provera treatment by voluntarily
undergoing a "permanent, surgical alternative." CAL. PENAL CODE § 645(e).
209. See Robert D. Miller, The Forced Administration of Sex-drive Reducing Medications to
Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, in PSYCHOLOGY, PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW (forthcom-
ing 1998).
210. 134 Mich. App. 737 (1984).
211. Gauntlett, 134 Mich. App. at 747-50.
212. Id. at 751.
213. Id. at 750.
214. See supra note 151 and accompanying texL
215. See, e.g., Edward Hanin, The Regulating Effect of the Managed Care Movement, in PSY-
CHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT, THE MEDIA AND SPECIAL
INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THERAPIES 147-69 (Harold Schwartz ed., 1994); Harold Schwartz, The
Impact of Cost-Containment Measures on Somatic Psychiatry, in PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE UNDER
FIRE: THE INFLUENCE OF GovERNmENr, THE MEDIA AND SPECIAL INTERESTS ON SOMATIC THER-
APIES 135-46 (Harold Schwartz ed., 1994)..
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ment caps, capitation, prospective drug use review, restricted formularies,
preferred pharmacy networks, copayment plans, "economic credentialling," and
the use of nonmedical professionals to screen mentally disordered patients. 16
Although comprehensive data are not yet available, Dr. Schwartz presents data
from a number of studies that suggest that these practices limit the appropriate
use of psychiatrists and psychiatric somatic treatments on nonclinical bas-
es." 7 Psychiatrists who have actively Opposed Such rati arcrt
motivated in part by their own economic self interests, but they chose their
professions in larger part to provide service to mentally disordered persons,
and are systematically being prevented from doing so by purely economic -
factors. But psychiatrists often find themselves in the dilemma of obeying their
masters on possible penalty of losing their jobs, while simultaneously risking
malpractice suits for delivering care that they themselves know is inade-
quate.
218
A number of cases have addressed the responsibility of managed care
organizations to provide adequate medical care. In Wickline v. State,2 9 the
California Court of Appeals held that Medi-Cal was not liable when a physi-
cian discharged a patient too soon and post-operative complications en-
sued,' but it did observe that "[tihird party payers of health care services
can be held legally accountable when medically inappropriate decisions result
from defects in the design or implementation of cost containment mecha-
nisms." In Hughes v. Blue Cross of Northern California,"' Blue Cross retro-
spectively denied payment for several hospitalizations, arguing that the hospi-
tal had not provided adequate records to justify the hospitalizations. 2 The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's verdict for the plaintiff,
including punitive damages, holding that Blue Cross failed to make reasonable
efforts to obtain adequate information.? In Harrell v. Total Health Care,
Inc.,224 the Missouri Court of Appeals found that a state statute exempting a
managed care entity from liability for negligence was constitutional, and that
the legislature could distinguish between hospitals, which are liable for negli-
gence in selecting and supervising staff, and managed care entities, which are
not.m
216. Id.
217. Schwartz, supra note 215.
218. Id.; see also Paul Appelbaum, Legal Liability and Managed Care, 48 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 251 (1993).
219. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
220. Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 672. The court stated:
This court appreciates that what is at issue here is the effect of cost containment pro-
grams upon the professional judgment of physicians to prescribe hospital treatment for
patients requiring the same. While we recognize, realistically, that cost consciousness
has become a permanent feature of the health care system, it is essential that cost limita-
tion programs not be permitted to corrupt medical judgment We have concluded, from
the facts in issue here, that in this case it did not.
Id.
221. 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1988).
222. Hughes, 245 Cal. Rpr. at 276-77.
223. Id. at 279.
224. 781 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
225. Harrell, 781 S.W.2d at 62-64.
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D. Internal Moral Coercion on Clinicians
The legal concept of rights under which legal activists operate is a rela-
tively recent historical phenomenon, but it *has become so dominant in the
United States that it is taken for granted. Although individual rights have lost
some of their preeminent status recently, attempts to utilize different concepts
of rights have met with rejection by the prevailing culture. Under the Greek
theory of natural rights,' which established the original basis for the prac-
tice of medicine, the "wise man," a category which included the physician,
had the duty to restore patients to physical and mental health so that they
could fulfill their obligations as citizens. Those afflicted with mental or physi-
cal illnesses had a concomitant responsibility to cooperate with their physi-
cians by following their orders.
Talcott Parsons, in his discussion of the "sick role,"' followed the
Greek concept by arguing that there are four aspects of the social expectation
system relative to the sick role: 1) an exemption from normal social role re-
sponsibilities, with such exemption requiring legitimization, ultimately by
physicians, and imposing obligations on the patient; 2) no expectation that the
sick person can get well by an act of decision or will; 3) definition of the
illness as an undesirable state, and desire by the patient to get well; and 4) a
requirement that the patient seek technically competent help and cooperate
with the helper in trying to get well. Because of "secondary gain," a patient
may be motivated to continue the privileges and exemptions of the sick
role."5 Just as it is the patient's obligation to cooperate in getting well, it is
the physician's obligation to "do his part" in helping the patient to get well.
Parsons did not explicitly consider the societal obligations of the physician to
restore his patients to health, so that they may (in Parsons' words) become
"functional" again.'
Physicians, including psychiatrists, continue to be socialized in their train-
ing to be responsible for the health of their patients, although the sense of
responsibility is usually so covert as to be almost subliminal. When they ac-
cept patients-particularly patients that are legally committed to their
care-who refuse the prescribed treatment-especially if they do so because
they deny the very disorder for which treatment is being recommended-it
places physicians in a considerable, if usually unexamined, ethical and profes-
sional bind.
226. See Leonard Kaplan & Robert D. Miller, Law, Psychiatry and Rights, presented at the
15th International Congress on Law and Mental Health, Jerusalem, Israel (June 26, 1989) (on file
with author).
227. TALcOTr PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 428-79 (1951).
228. Goffman first discussed impression management by apparently mentally disordered per-
sons. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
Subsequent controlled research studies verify that patients diagnosed with schizophrenia are quite
capable of varying their behavior and reported thinking, depending on their goals in the situation.
See Benjamin Braginski & Dorothea Braginski, Schizophrenic Patients in the Psychiatric Inter-
view: An Experimental Study of Their Effectiveness at Manipulation, 31 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL.
543 (1967); Mark Sherman et al., Impression Management in the Psychiatric Interview: Quality,
Style, and Individual Differences, 43 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 867 (1975).
229. PARSONS, supra note 227.
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Nonmedical mental health professionals are socialized in different ways
and are, as a result, demonstrably less authoritarian in their relationships with
their clients.230 Nonpsychiatric physicians are subject to the same profession-
al pressures as are psychiatrists; but they have several escape clauses not
available to psychiatrists. Most important, with rare exceptions, patients are
not legally committed to nonpsychiatric physicians. Those doctors, therefore,
have the option of terminating the physician-patient relationship with patients
that refuse to accept their recommendations. Nonpsychiatric physicians also
frequently will not treat mentally disordered patients even for their
nonpsychiatric illnesses, referring them instead to psychiatrists.
VII. DIscussIoN
We live in a society in which coercion-governmental and private, overt
and covert, subtle and dramatic-impacts on everyone in some way or anoth-
er, but mentally disordered persons are perhaps subject to more coercion than
most other groups. In order to utilize the benefits of coercion while minimiz-
ing the negative, socially unproductive effects, it is essential that all types of
coercion be considered. It is not sufficient to examine part of the elephant and
conclude that the problems are understood, much less solved. Legal rights are
certainly important, but they remain only one small part of the picture. Single-
minded attention to legal rights has led to increases in other types of coercion
of mentally disordered persons that are at times arguably worse than the abol-
ished or modified coercion.23'
Before the civil rights litigation of the 1960s and '70s, psychiatrists large-
ly called the shots in dealing with mentally disordered persons. They resisted
intrusion by the courts into what they considered areas of clinical expertise.
They resented restrictive civil commitment statutes, the recognition of a right
to refuse treatment, and various reporting dutiesY2 By staking out a narrow
230. See Frank Baker & Herbert Schulberg, The Development of a Community Mental Health
Ideology Scale, 3 COMMUNrrY MENTAL HEALTH J. 216 (1967); Robert Langston, Community
Mental Health Centers and Community Mental Health Ideology, 6 CoMMUNrrY MENTAL HEALTH
J. 387 (1970). Even the terms by which different mental health professionals refer to the mentally
disordered persons whom they treat demonstrate significant conceptual differences: medically-
trained clinicians (psychiatrists and nurses) use the term "patient," while nonmedical clinicians
(psychologists, social workers, and other therapists) prefer "client."
231. In a classic paper, Penrose argued that the distribution of "socially undesirable" persons
in prisons or mental hospitals depends on the availability of hospitals and the thoroughness of the
psychiatric evaluations. See generally L.S. Penrose, Mental Disease and Crime: Outline of a Com-
parative Study of European Statistics, 18 BRrr. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 1 (1939). His observations have
come to be called the "hydraulic theory," which holds that societal tolerance for deviant behavior
is limited, and that if one repository for such persons is reduced (e.g., limiting involuntary psychi-
atric hospitalization,) another (e.g., incarceration in the criminal justice system) will expand to
respond to the social need. While the situation he described is certainly unfortunate, it is also the
reality that must be fully considered in analyzing coercion.
232. In the Council of the American Psychiatric Association, Position Statement on the Ade-
quacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458 (1967), the Council rebuffed judicial efforts to
establish a right to treatment, stating, "The definition of treatment and the appraisal of its adequa-
cy are matters for medical determination. Final authority with respect to interpreting the law on
the subject rests with the courts." The American Psychiatric Association for years steadfastly op-
posed court inquiry into such matters, and in fact refused to submit a brief to the court in Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), recommending clinical standards when requested to
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territory, attorneys and advocates wrested hegemony over those aspects of
mental health care that impinged on civil rights. Activist patient groups have
rejected the goals of both clinicians and advocates in favor of just being left
alone. 3 Groups representing families of mentally disordered persons, such
as the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, have supported easier access to
treatment, and have generally sided with the psychiatrists. The National Men-
tal Health Association has supported legal rights in some situations and clini-
cal rights in others.
Addressing unproductive coercion effectively will require collaboration
among all the groups concerned with mentally disordered persons. The ex-
tremists in each camp must moderate their positions and be willing to com-
promise or they remain a major part of the problem, rather than the solution.
Adversarial roles will continue to be important in individual cases, but as they,
by definition, ignore the larger systemic issues, they do not contribute to sys-
tem solutions. 34 Litigation will still be necessary in individual situations in
which the legislative and executive branches of government are unwilling to
provide adequate resources. It is not, however, sufficient to deal with
multisystem problems, especially with the "hands off" policies currently in
vogue in federal courts. Legislative action will be essential, and legislators are
more responsive when all the interest groups concerned are in accord.
There must be some common ground among those groups for progress to
be made. One axiom that must be accepted is that mental illness is not a myth,
and that at least some mental disorders are biological diseases that respond to
do so. Fortunately, the APA has changed its position significantly since those days, and now reg-
ularly submits amicus briefs to the Supreme Court on issues involving mentally disordered per-
sons, and assists local chapters of the Association in state and lower federal court cases.
233. The problem, of course, is that if "left alone" by the mental health system, their behavior
will not allow the mentally disordered to be left alone by the many other systems of social con-
trol, such as the police, social services, etc. If they choose the latter course competently, then that
choice should certainly be respected. The conflict arises when the mentally disordered make self-
destructive choices based on treatable mental disorders. The issue is not merely an individual's
right to privacy, because most mentally disordered persons who are not committed to psychiatric
treatment, or who are committed but not required to take medication, consume governmental re-
sources that would not be required if they were to be treated effectively, even against their stated
wishes.
234. When the author served as director of the admissions unit at a state mental hospital, he
organized regular meetings with the chief judge, sheriff, police chief, district attorney's office,
public defender's office, community mental health center director, and social services liaison for
the hospital's major catchment area, to coordinate plans for a small but very difficult population of
mentally disordered persons who bounced back and forth among all the social systems in the area.
Before the meetings, no system would accept responsibility for these patients, and there was noth-
ing resembling continuity of care. At the meetings, individual treatment plans were developed for
each person. Outpatient and inpatient mental health services, as well as correctional and social
service involvement, were apportioned according to the behavior and degree of mental disorder of
each person. As a result, the systems were able to.work together with these very difficult patients,
rather than dumping them back and forth amongst themselves. The severity of mental disorder and
the criminal behaviors both decreased significantly, and remained at a low level over time.
235. The parity legislation discussed above in note 151 passed despite significant dissention
among the various mental health professional groups. Psychiatrists (who had the most to gain,
since the disorders covered are those usually treated with psychotropic medications) supported the
legislation, while other clinical organizations either abstained or opposed the legislation. Such
guild-based dissention highlights the various mental health professions' economic interests in
parity and similar legislation, and thereby significantly weakens the credibility of its advocates.
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treatment with medications and other organic methods.2" Another is that
mental disorders vary significantly in their severity and in their effects on
individual patients' autonomy. A third is that the goal of treatment must be to
restore patients' autonomy, and that patients' wishes must be respected as
much as possible, as the more voluntary and collaborative the treatment, the
more effective it is likely to prove.237 It is here that the findings of procedur-
aljustice research are particularly important-psychiatrists have not tradition-
ally been trained to listen to their patients' wishes in areas of biological treat-
ment; when they do so, many of the problems disappear.
23S
Planning groups must consider the ripple effects of litigation and legisla-
tion, and avoid disasters such as deinstitutionalization which resulted in pa-
tients being "involuntarily communitized 239 before adequate resources in the
community were available. One current example of similar problems is the
movement to reverse the criminalization of mentally disordered persons
through jail diversion programs.2' As with the deinstitutionalization of civil
psychiatric hospitals, there is considerable consensus that many mentally disor-
dered inmates charged with minor crimes do not belong in jail. It is not diffi-
cult to remove mentally disordered persons from jails; what is difficult is to
find a place to send them. Those diversion programs that are effective work
because there are community mental health facilities willing to accept the
responsibility of treating those diverted.241
The placement of mentally disordered prison inmates is even more diffi-
cult. Many inmates committed crimes in part because they could or would not
236. Psychotherapy is not usually as effective as medication under coercive conditions,
though Katherine Schneider-Braus would disagree. See Schneider-Braus, supra note 201. Dr.
Schneider-Braus reported that her patient became more invested in treatment after being commit-
ted, because she felt that the therapist was also committed to her under the court order, and thus
would not abandon her. Id.
237. Medications are effective with noncooperative-but not with non-compliant-patients.
Hiday and Scheid-Cook have reported that patients involuntarily committed to outpatient treat-
ment, including court orders for medication, were highly compliant with the medication, but long-
term treatment necessitates that patients accept their need for medication and take it because they
know that it helps them, not because of a court order. See Hiday & Scheid-Cook, supra note 63.
238. A careful reading of Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. NJ. 1978), indicates that
Rennie was not so much refusing treatment as he was specific medications that the psychiatrist
was prescribing for him. It is possible that had the psychiatrist been more receptive to Rennie's
preferences, there might never have been a legal case.
239. Stephen Rachlin, With Liberty and Psychosis for All, 48 PsYCHIATRIC Q. 410, 410
(1974).
240. See STEADMAN Er AL., supra note 79.
241. See id. Steadman and his co-authors make a persuasive case that jails are part of the
community, and therefore inmates should receive mental health care from community mental
health centers. Where the centers accept the responsibility to provide treatment to persons involved
with the criminal justice system, diversion is quite effective. Even when community centers are
willing to become involved, however, obstacles remain. For example, many states indemnify local
service providers from liability that arises from treatment of such patients; but the Colorado state
constitution prohibits such protections:
Neither the state, nor any county, city, town, township or school district shall lend or
pledge the credit or faith thereof, directly or indirectly, in any manner to, or in aid of,
any person, company or corporation, public or private, for any amount, or for any pur-
pose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, contract or liability of any person,
company or corporation, public or private, in or out of the state.
COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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receive treatment in the community. As difficult as it is to obtain treatment
before a felony conviction, the convicted felon is even less likely to receive
treatment, in part because community mental health centers justifiably fear lia-
bility if the future parolee commits additional violent acts. As a result of these
obstacles, the sad reality is that many mentally disordered persons receive
better mental health care in prisons than they do in the community, and the
lack of community facilities willing to accept parolees prolongs their incarcer-
ations. Approaches to this problem require cooperation between the local and
state correctional systems, the state and community mental health systems, and
often the legislature as well. When all elements work together, diversion pro-
grams are demonstrably effective.
Areas in which interdisciplinary cooperation can reduce unnecessary coer-
cion of mentally disordered persons include providing relevant information to
legislatures and state bureaucracies concerning requirements to report confi-
dential information about patients (such as the duties to protect third persons,
and to report child, elder and domestic abuse) and other legislation affecting
mentally disordered persons such as sexual predator acts, chemical castration,
and changes in civil commitment law. Further, professional licensing boards
should be furnished current data in areas such as the medically appropriate use
of anti-anxiety, psychostimulant, and narcotic medications.
A combination of the concepts of procedural justice and therapeutic juris-
prudence would seem to provide the best hope of stimulating the interdisci-
plinary and cross-system collaboration which is essential if meaningful an-
swers to the problems of coercion in all its guises are to be successfully ad-
dressed.
VIII. SUMMARY
Those genuinely concerned with mentally disordered persons can no lon-
ger afford to specialize in one part of the problem. The majority of coercion
currently experienced by mentally disordered persons does not come from
direct state action, and efforts to convince the federal courts to create new
legal rights to community-based treatment are not meeting with the success
that earlier suits against hospitals did. Thus, the adversarial approach (even
when the clinician defendants actually agree with the complaints) 2 is not
only divisive, but has lost much of its effectiveness in reducing total coercion.
The social and economic problems responsible for most coercion in practice
can be dealt with only through interdisciplinary cooperation.
The apparent conflict between legal and clinical rights is more illusory
than real; observation of legal rights does not need to interfere with the provi-
sion of clinical rights. In fact, the two can work together as long as each side
considers the broader systemic issues discussed in this article. It is only when
extremists on either side ignore the rest of the elephant that problems occur.
Appropriate recognition of the civil rights of mentally disordered persons has
led to greater autonomy, as well as better treatment, for patients. But when
242. See Conference Report, supra note 142, at 124.
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ideologues refuse to listen to other viewpoints, and act as if their positions are
the only acceptable ones, problems will and do occur. Libertarians cannot
continue to use legal methods as covert abolitionist techniques to coerce their
ideological opponents (and even their supposed "clients" at times); and clini-
cians cannot continue to undermine the observation of legitimate patient rights.
This is not a plea by a clinician to return to the "good old days" before
the courts began to take an active interest in mental health issues. Judicial
oversight is important symbolically as well as practically, even where judges
defer to clinical judgments. The major problems with the current due process
protections is not that they prevent needed treatment, but that they delay it
excessively.243 As with justice, "treatment delayed"2" may be better than
no treatment at all; but that should not be the choice.
243. The time period between clinicians' requests for court hearings on involuntary medica-
tions vary, but are usually measured in weeks to months. See Miller et al., supra note 55.
244. Pierce County v. Western State Hosp., 97 Wash. 2d 264, 270 (1982) (stating that
"[tireatment delayed and inadequate must surely be better than no treatment at all," and ordering
Washington State Hospital to cease its moratorium on admissions in spite of severe overcrowding
which resulted in patients sleeping on cots in halls).
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